The Wassenaar Arrangement and the Moratorium for West Africa

Ambassador Staffan Sohlmans, Chairman, Wassenaar Arrangement
5 May 1999, Henri Dunant Centre

 

Mr. President Konaré, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Permit me to start by giving you a brief presentation of the Wassenaar Arrangement and then turn to review how the Arrangement during the last three years has reacted to the ECOWAS moratorium on importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa.

I am indeed Chairman in office of the Wassenaar Arrangement but I must point out that what I am about to say is on my own personal behalf, not a text accepted by the Arrangement as such.

With the end of the Cold War, the confrontation between East and West was replaced by a more diffuse set of security concerns. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of sophisticated conventional arms and sensitive technologies to regions of instability belong to such new transnational challenges.

The demand for weapons and respective "know how" unfortunately remains high in several areas of the world. At the same time weapons of concern became more accessible after removal of the Cold War barriers and restrictions. The explosion of trade and technology transfers in the 1990s has produced a new global economy in which people, ideas and capital interact more quickly and more easily than before.

That is why concerns regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, advanced conventional weapons, and sensitive technologies have emerged at the top of the international political agenda in the recent years. Great attention has been paid to improving already existing networks of treaties, transparency measures and export control systems and to introducing additional multilateral efforts to address questions of proliferation. Developments in Asia, Africa and Europe have tragically underlined the urgency of these efforts.

The Wassenaar Arrangement, which I currently chair, is one of these efforts. It is the first truly multilateral agreement since the end of the Cold War covering export controls on both conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.

This 33-country Arrangement is named after the Dutch town of Wassenaar, a suburb close to the Hague. With the Gulf War still on the mind of many participants, agreement was reached there in 1995 to start a new type of multilateral co-operation to prevent destabilising accumulations of arms and sensitive technologies by establishing a process of transparency and consultation, and by promoting greater responsibility in transfers of controlled items. The participating states include Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Argentina, North America and all countries in Europe, including the Russian Federation and Turkey.

Vigilance through export controls is necessary because many of the materials and technologies that have legitimate, peaceful applications are also used in the manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction or more conventional weapons. Moreover, part of the commitment undertaken by Wassenaar members also entails controlling trade in conventional weapons transfers in order to ensure that the objectives of the Arrangement are carried out.

The Wassenaar Arrangement is not another formal international organisation, but rather a forum of like-minded countries. Members use it as a venue to exchange information and share concerns in the area of export controls, with the objective of preventing accumulations of military capacity where they would threaten regional or international security and stability.

Participants commit themselves to carrying out effective controls at the national level on transfers of conventional arms and dual-use technology, to exchange information confidentially within the Arrangement on transfers of controlled items to non-members, and to report on denials of licences. They further more exchange information on worrisome military build-ups and other threats to security in various regions of the world. Reporting denials helps to bring to the attention of partners the transfers that may be destructive. Frankness in exchanging such sensitive information can help in eliminating inadvertent competition and corruption and thereby foster national export policies more compatible with each others’ security concerns.

The Arrangement’s information exchange requirements involve notifications of arms transfers to third countries, currently covering seven categories derived from the UN Register of Conventional Arms (tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, helicopters, warships, missiles). However, unlike in the UN, this information is provided more frequently (twice per year) and includes more details than previously requested.

Participants meet regularly in Vienna and, on the basis information exchanged on international dual-use and arms transfers, discuss risks associated with potentially destabilising acquisitions of armaments in certain regions.

Through transparency and consultation, suppliers of arms and dual-use items can develop common understandings of the risks associated with their transfer and assess the scope for co-ordinating national control policies to combat these risks. Information exchange, persuasion by peers, and reasoned discussion among responsible countries are its characteristics.

When the Wassenaar Arrangement was being negotiated, I do not believe that the concerns arising from the proliferation of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons was the foremost post-Cold War security concern on the minds of its negotiators. However, our consciousness of the problems of insecurity due to unwanted proliferation of light weapons has been enhanced recently by the work of those associated with this Conference. In particular, the efforts of West African states involved with Mali’s initiative to tackle the demand side of the problem have been important in getting our attention.

The Arrangement took note of the initiative to establish a West African moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of light weapons, which was proposed in the Bamako Conference of November 1996. I sent a representative of the Chair to the follow-up Conference in Bamako in March 1997, the first anniversary of the "Flamme de la Paix". Following our report on the initiative, we discussed the matter in several meetings. Several of our participating states pointed out the importance of such an initiative in countries that have suffered from the dangerous proliferation of such weapons.

Further briefings by representatives of Mali and other officials involved in this effort in several of our capitals were instrumental in developing sympathy and support for the Moratorium initiative. In our December 1997 plenary representatives of the 33 countries participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement joined a consensus to welcome and encourage publicly the Moratorium development.

Wassenaar Participating States further promptly responded to the formal declaration of the Moratorium by ECOWAS in October last year by welcoming it in their December 1998 Plenary Public Statement. They also announced their intention to undertake an appropriate collaborative role with ECOWAS member states to respect the provisions of the moratorium and to be open to providing advisory and/or technical assistance in its implementation. Such collaboration may primarily be bilateral, between the individual Wassenaar country and ECOWAS members, rather than involve the Wassenaar Arrangement directly. Nevertheless, there has been and should remain a Wassenaar dimension that supplements bilateral contacts and developments.

Following our December Plenary, ECOWAS Moratorium officials met in Vienna again in January of this year to inform the Head of the WA Secretariat and representatives from WA countries. I again sent a representative to the March ministerial meeting in Bamako that launched the PCASED programme. These contacts help keep the ECOWAS effort on our agenda.

National experts may be best equipped to determine how the WA could contribute in practical terms to the implementation of the Moratorium. I know that our representatives have already recommended that ECOWAS send a formal note, either to the WA in Vienna for further distribution, or via diplomatic note to the capitals of the 33 countries in the Wassenaar Arrangement, notifying the entry into force of the Moratorium, and requesting countries to comply with it in their export control policies. I was pleased to note that the final communique from the last Bamako ministerial instructed the ECOWAS Secretariat to take action with respect to this notification. Since export control authorities must provide clear and specific guidelines and regulations, the ECOWAS notification to Wassenaar or Wassenaar countries could usefully provide detailed information on the categories and technical parameters of weapons covered by the moratorium program. I am confident that the WA Secretariat could, if asked, give useful technical advise. It would also help to know any provisions relating to exceptions and notification of exceptions. I also welcome the intention of ECOWAS countries to adopt a "Code of Conduct" for application of the Moratorium, which contains useful recommendations on moving ahead.

The Moratorium will be on our agenda for the next General Working Group meeting in May. I believe that Wassenaar countries could discuss then what measures they could take in their export control regulations and policies to assure compliance.

I will also recommend that, when Wassenaar countries contact non-member arms suppliers, or make what we call outreach efforts, we express our support for the Moratorium as a measure of responsible export control policy.

The suggested Plan of PCASED activities includes, among other priorities, the objective of "facilitating dialogue with producers and suppliers." Contacts between the Wassenaar and PCASED/Moratorium secretariats could be an aspect of this dialogue, and become a way of delivering messages and reports more broadly to WA membership. I believe that such a dialogue could enhance the information exchange we already have in Wassenaar.

In the future, it might be useful for ECOWAS Moratorium and Wassenaar experts to discuss experience under the Moratorium, perhaps leading to further specification of the small arms and light weapons covered by whatever measures follow up the current three year Moratorium.

In closing, earlier I mentioned that the security concerns caused by small arms were not foremost in our minds when the Wassenaar Arrangement was established. Our participants, however, recognize that their commitment to responsible transfers and effective export controls does not exclude small arms and light weapons. As responsible suppliers, we must be responsive to the security concerns posed by small arms and make sure that any lapses in the effectiveness of our export controls do not result in our contributing to an exacerbation of the problem.

In our Wassenaar work, we have looked at other areas of the world where the proliferation of weapons contributes to instability. Central Africa and Afghanistan are examples. We take these problems seriously and are working to strengthen our commitment to responsible export controls on these items.

Our objective is to contribute to peace and security in a safer world. I trust that the commitment of our 33 participating countries will complement and make more effective efforts like this important West African initiative.