The Wassenaar Arrangement and the
Proposed Moratorium for West Africa

 

Staffan Sohlman

 

With the end of the Cold War the serious threat to peace posed by confrontation between East and West was replaced by a more diffuse set of security concerns. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of sophisticated conventional arms and sensitive dual-use technologies, where they could foster instability, definitely are among such new transnational challenges.

The demand for weapons and respective ‘know-how’ remains high. At the same time weapons became more accessible after the removal of the Cold War barriers and restrictions. The explosion of trade and technology exchange that followed it has produced a new global economy in which people, ideas and capital come together more quickly and more easily than before.

That is why concerns regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, advanced conventional weapons, and sensitive technologies have emerged at the top of the international political agenda in recent years. Great attention has been paid to improving already existing networks of treaties, transparency measures and export control systems and to introducing additional multilateral efforts to address questions of proliferation.

The Wassenaar Arrangement, which I currently chair, is one of them. It is the first global multilateral agreement covering export controls on both conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.

This 33-country arrangement is named after the Dutch town of Wassenaar, a posh suburb of The Hague. With the Gulf War still on the mind of many participants, agreement was reached there in l995 to start a new type of multilateral cooperation to prevent destabilising accumulations of arms and sensitive technologies by establishing a process of transparency and consultation, and by promoting greater responsibility in transfers of controlled items.

The Wassenaar Arrangement contemplates and reinforces, without duplication, the existing regimes for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. As its long, full name indicates, the arrangement is designed to respond to the new threats through vigilant export control efforts.

Vigilance through export controls is necessary because many of the materials and technologies that have legitimate, peaceful applications are also used in the manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction or more conventional weapons. Moreover, part of the commitment to responsibility undertaken by the Wassenaar members also entails controlling conventional weapons transfers in order to ensure that the objectives of the arrangement are carried out.

Export controls could help to ensure that exports of controlled commodities and technology do not assist in the development or manufacture of weapons or do not contribute to the regional destabilising military capabilities in critical situations.

The Wassenaar Arrangement is not another formal international organisation, but rather a forum of like-minded countries. Members use it as a venue to exchange information and share concerns in the area of export controls, with the objective of preventing accumulations of military capacity where they would threaten regional or international security and stability.

Participants commit themselves to carrying out effective controls at the national level on transfers of conventional arms and dual-use technology, as well as to exchange information confidentially within the arrangement on transfers of controlled items to non-members, on denials of licences to destinations where the concerns are greatest, and on worrisome military build-ups and other threats to security in various regions of the world. Denial reporting helps to bring to the attention of partners the transfers that may undermine the objectives of the arrangement. I might add that frankness in exchanging such sensitive information can help eliminate inadvertent undercuts and thereby foster national export policies more compatible with each other’s security concerns.

The arrangement’s specific information exchange requirements involve notifications of arms transfers to third countries, currently covering seven categories derived from the UN Register of Conventional Arms (tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, helicopters, warships, missiles). However, unlike in the UN, this information is provided more frequently (twice per year) and includes more details than previously requested.

Participants meet regularly in Vienna, and on the basis of information exchanged on international dual-use and arms transfers discuss risks associated with destabilising acquisitions of armaments in certain regions.

The instruments of the Wassenaar Arrangement are not overly burdensome or intrusive. Much tougher multilateral arrangements exist in other non-proliferation areas, such as those to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons or nuclear testing, which rely on legally binding treaties, clear rules, and mechanisms for monitoring and inspection. In contrast, the Wassenaar Arrangement is a political undertaking devoid of legally binding rules.

Through transparency and consultation, suppliers of arms and dual-use items can develop common understandings of the risks associated with their transfer and assess the scope for coordinating national control policies to combat these risks. Information exchange, persuasion by peers, and reasoned discussion among responsible countries are its characteristics.

The arrangement does not impede bona fide civil transactions and is not directed against any state or group of states. It does not interfere with the rights of states to acquire legitimate means with which to defend themselves pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The arrangement is open on a global and non-discriminatory basis to prospective adherents that comply with the agreed criteria. To be admitted, a state must be a producer/exporter of arms or industrial equipment respectively, maintain non-proliferation policies, effective export controls, and appropriate national policies.

At their last plenary meeting in December 1997, participants publicly appealed to all non-members to support the goals of the arrangement. They also agreed to provide more transparency with respect to the activities of the arrangement through establishing dialogue with non-member countries as well as with relevant international organisations.

When the Wassenaar Arrangement was being negotiated, I do not believe that the concerns arising from the proliferation of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons were the foremost post-Cold War security concern on the minds of its negotiators. However, our consciousness of the problems of insecurity due to unwanted proliferation of weapons has been enhanced recently by the work of those associated with this conference. In particular, the efforts of West African states involved with Mali’s initiative to tackle the demand side of the problem have been important in getting our attention.

The arrangement took note of the initiative to establish a West African moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of light weapons, which was proposed in the Bamako Conference of November 1996. I sent a representative of the Chair to the follow-up conference in Bamako in March 1997, the first anniversary of the ‘Flamme de la Paix’. Following our report on the initiative, we discussed the matter in several meetings. Several of our participating states, including your host country today, pointed out the importance of such an initiative in countries that have suffered from the dangerous proliferation of such weapons.

Further briefings by Malian and other officials involved in this effort in several of our capitals were instrumental in developing sympathy and support for the moratorium initiative. In our December 1997 plenary meeting, representatives of the 33 countries participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement joined a consensus to welcome and encourage publicly the moratorium development.

I mentioned that the security concerns caused by small arms were not foremost in our minds in the establishment of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Our members, however, recognise that their commitment to responsible transfers and effective export controls does not preclude small arms and light weapons. We, as responsible suppliers, must be responsive to the security concerns posed by small arms and make sure that lapses in the effectiveness of our export controls do not result in our contributing to an exacerbation of the problem.

In our meetings and papers we have looked at other areas of the world where the proliferation of light weapons contributes to instability. Central Africa and Afghanistan are examples. Our members take these problems seriously and are working to strengthen their commitments to responsible export controls on these items.

Under one initiative aimed at thwarting illicit trafficking in weapons, members have been urged to exchange more information that will alert control authorities to potentially risky situations.

Our objective is to contribute to peace and security in a safer world. Wassenaar can contribute only one small part to the effort to ensure more responsible trade in sensitive items, such as weapons. I trust that the commitment of our 33 participating countries will complement and make all the more effective efforts like the West African initiative and those being undertaken or contemplated in several international organisations.

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