The Programme for Co-ordination and
Assistance for Security and Development
in West Africa (PCASED)

 

Tore Rose

 

Mr. President of Mali, Ministers, Distinguished Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen, as you may already know, PCASED, the Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development, would be the technical and secretariat mechanism for the proposed Small Arms Moratorium in West Africa. But before presenting PCASED, I would like to briefly sketch out the context of UNDP and United Nations involvement in post-conflict peace-building and practical disarmament in Mali – and beyond. It is from this process that the so-called ‘security first’ approach to development has emerged.

‘Security first’, based on a proportional and integrated approach encompassing development and security, refers to the obvious fact that without security in civilian life there can be no serious and sustainable development; and, conversely, that without serious and sustainable development, there will be insecurity or worse. Operationally, ‘security first’ means that development partners, aid donors, should draw the necessary conclusions from this obvious linkage between security and development. But unfortunately, experience has shown that, for many donors, such operational conclusions can present significant difficulties. This is because of the logical, but not always realistic, view that it is the responsibility of the State to assure a secure environment for development.

But aid money can, in certain circumstances, be justifiably spent on helping countries to strengthen their capacity to assure internal security. Such assistance must be viewed as totally different in its rationale and execution as compared to traditional bilateral military co-operation. It must not be confused with weapons supplies and training in military doctrines for political aims. For historical reasons which have to do with the image of foreign governments supporting oppressive regimes and their security apparatus, ‘security first’ assistance is a very hard idea for parliamentarians and ministers in donor countries to swallow. But I think that recent experience, certainly in Africa, demonstrates that the time is ripe for a paradigm shift in our thinking on this issue.

First of all, consider the enormous amount of aid money, spent over two or three decades, which has gone down the drain as a consequence of conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, ex-Zaire, Congo, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Angola, and even Uganda. Secondly, consider the cost of UN or African regional interventions, or even bilateral interventions, to restore and maintain order in conflict and post-conflict countries: millions of dollars can be spent in only days or weeks. Thirdly, let me mention the case of Mali’s so-called ‘Tuareg rebellion’: basically because of the wisdom of Mali’s traditional leaders and its President and the depth of Mali’s social capitals – civil war was averted. The ‘security first’ approach played a major role, at a cost to the international community of a couple of million dollars, plus ten million for the demobilisation of ex-combatants. Countless lives were saved, socio-political stability was maintained, and the economic impact of the conflict was relatively limited. This positive experience is, of course, not well known; fortunately there was not enough visible mayhem and bloodshed to attract a great deal of international media attention.

So, when the donor community is able to take a holistic view of development, and focus on the overall welfare of the peoples in the countries they try to assist, it becomes possible to achieve the necessary paradigm shift, and accept that aid money can legitimately be used to re-establish and maintain security. ‘Security first’ is simply a way of supporting good governance when conflicts risk getting out of hand. Democracy becomes fragile in an unstable socio-political environment.

The ‘Mali story’, involving the application of ‘security first’ and intensive and sustained peacebuilding, is told in the book A Peace of Timbuktu which each delegation has received. On a wider canvas, these ideas, and many others around the theme of conflict prevention and peace-building, are presented in a second book, Back to Basics, which each delegation has also received.

The peace-building process in Mali has had some important side effects. United Nations support had begun in 1994 when the Secretary-General, at the request of the President of Mali, sent a UN mission to study, and make recommendations on, the proliferation of illicit small arms. This was followed by UN missions to neighbouring countries, and the establishment of national commissions on the control of small arms in the six countries visited.

Another by-product was that Mali launched itself into a re-examination of the role of the military in its society. Recent history has unfortunately provided only too many examples of armed forces that are abusive, anti-democratic and anti-civil society. But all states have military forces: they are here to stay. So-called mature democracies have developed formal and informal mechanisms, which result in a military institution that is a positive – or at least neutral – part of society, and even a force for stability rather than instability. Indeed, the professionalisation of the military institution is perhaps a pre-condition for democracy. So it should be logical that, again taking a holistic view, helping a society to find a stable and respected role for its military can be as important to that society’s well-being as improving the vaccination coverage. This may even require increased military expenditures in the short run, during the professionalisation process when the police, the gendarmerie, the customs service and the military receive training and appropriate equipment and conditions of service. The United Nations has assisted the Malian process of re-examination of the role of its uniformed forces, and their relations with the rest of society. One result is the issuing of a Code of Conduct booklet to all uniformed personnel, which describes, in simple language, the role and duties of a professional and republican army, and introduces soldiers to human rights concepts. This is a first in Africa.

Another important event was a joint Mali/UN Conference on Conflict Prevention, Disarmament and Development in West Africa, in November 1996, which was followed by a special ministerial-level consultation in Bamako in March 1997. The ‘security first’ approach was further endorsed by another high-level consultation on post-conflict peace-building in West Africa which took place in New York on 21 October 1996 under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. These gatherings gave shape to the Malian President’s proposal for a moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of small arms. This moratorium proposal made its way, via discussions on the occasion of OAU meetings in 1997, to the current agenda of the Heads of State of ECOWAS. The proposed voluntary moratorium, which must be seen as basically a confidence-building and security-enhancing measure, is a visionary new departure. President Konaré has himself presented this vision to you this morning.

I will now return to the suggested technical and secretariat mechanism for the moratorium, PCASED: the Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development. For the sake of administrative simplicity, PCASED is foreseen, at least initially, as a UNDP project that seeks co-financing from interested donors. PCASED is a ‘security first’ aid project which needs multi-country financing. The arguments about ‘security first’, which I developed a few minutes ago, are valid for PCASED, and I can say that the paradigm shift is already taking place: three donors, including the host country for this conference, have given firm indications of financial support, and five others have already expressed themselves positively. But this support needs to be translated into specific financial or in-kind commitments, and we must hope that our discussions today will permit us to move rapidly towards that goal. In addition to contributions from states, the great interest shown in conflict, peace and development issues in the European Commission’s aid fora, and in the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, are extremely positive signs for the moratorium and for PCASED.

PCASED is designed to support and give technical backstopping to the moratorium, and to assist interested states on other issues related to peace-building, micro-disarmament, and the control of light weapons. This includes support for the setting up or revitalising of the national commissions in charge of the fight against the proliferation of small arms. It also includes the establishment and maintenance of a database on the flow of light weapons in the region, and the establishment of a subregional register of light weapons. Furthermore, it would provide technical support for improved border controls to suppress the passage of illicit arms, and training programmes for the forces of law and order in modern approaches and techniques in these areas.

Also, PCASED would be a focal point for updating and harmonising national legislation on the bearing, the use, and the production of light weapons, and on other technical issues arising in connection with disarmament and security matters. It is to be expected that when the moratorium becomes effective, the declaring states – which would constitute the governing body of PCASED – would amend, delete and add to these tasks according to their perceived needs. It is also foreseen that PCASED would benefit from an Advisory Group of recognised experts in its field of activities.

From the United Nations’ side, backstopping for PCASED is expected not only from UNDP, but also from the Departments of Political Affairs and of Disarmament Affairs of the UN Secretariat, and from the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR. PCASED will initially be set up for the projected three-year period of the moratorium, plus an additional two years to consolidate the likely post-moratorium regime.

UNDP, a development agency with the most comprehensive field presence of all, is now committed to working with governments, donors and civil society organisations on the ‘security first’ approach, and therefore with its concrete manifestation, PCASED, which is such a promising initiative for underpinning sustainable human development in Africa.

Finally, let me point out that United Nations support for the proposed moratorium, and for PCASED, is an example of the new synergies which the UN Secretary-General seeks to deepen through his reforms of the UN system. Following the UN missions to West Africa on small arms proliferation, a novel and fruitful collaboration began between UNDP and the UN Department of Political Affairs. Without this close partnership on the ground, little of the support for conflict reso- lution and peace-building in Mali that I have described would have been possible. I have said that UNIDIR is being very supportive; I should also mention that UNESCO through its Culture of Peace programme, and the UN Centre on Human Rights, are now involved with UNDP in helping the Malian Minister of Primary Education to insert peace and human rights into the primary school curriculum. Only a few days ago, on the second anniversary of the Flame of Peace in Timbuktu – the occasion of the burning of 3,000 arms laid down by ex-combatants – a conference on such a peace and human rights curriculum took place in Bamako.

We must also note some recent developments which are complementary to the vision of the moratorium and PCASED: firstly, the members of the Wassenaar Arrangement of arms-exporting countries recently declared themselves ready to work with moratorium-declaring countries; secondly, the France-Africa summit prepara- tory meeting in Ouagadougou last week decided that this year’s summit would focus on cooperation for security for conflict prevention; thirdly, the recent multi-national military exercises in Senegal supported by three major aid donors who are also military powers – operation ‘Guidimakha’ – trained African standby peacekeeping forces; fourthly, Belgium, with the European Union, is preparing a conference on small arms control later this year; and finally, next week the major donors’ aid ministers will discuss peace and security issues at their annual high-level meeting at the OECD.

Ladies and gentlemen, clearly the world’s attention is turning toward the linkage between security, conflict prevention, peace-building, and sustainable human development. The two books I mentioned give a wealth of insights into the challenges, difficulties and successes in addressing these linkages. The paradigm shift, toward an understanding that security can, in appropriate circumstances, be a legitimate concern of aid programmes, is beginning to appear. I am sure that what we discuss here today, and above all President Konaré’s keynote speech, will serve to deepen our understanding of these processes.

 

Thank you very much.

 

The author is UNDP Resident Representative and United Nations Resident Co-ordinator in Mali since 1995. Mr Rose has held various high-level positions within the UNDP in Algeria, Vietnam, Mozambique and Zambia. Further, he has worked in the Development Centre of the OECD, in the Office of the UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions and with the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations.

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