Regional Arrangements to Constrain
the Flow of Arms into Central Africa

 

Olu Adeniji

 

Background

According to the subdivision of Africa by the Organisation of African Unity, the Central African subregion consists of 11 countries, namely, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Principe. The mere enumeration of these countries, which include many in the Great Lakes region, conjures one inescapable fact about the subregion. lt is no doubt the most turbulent in the continent. In the last five years alone, five of the countries have witnessed violent conflicts. The bloodiest was the genocide in Rwanda, which in 1994 alone claimed between half a million and one million lives. Besides this, however, conflicts that have also led to large numbers of dead and mass flow of refugees and displaced persons have occurred in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congo. While the conflict in the Central African Republic has been relatively modest, it has nevertheless led to severe disruptions, calling for a regional peacekeeping force which is being considered for transformation into a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Mention ought also to be made of the festering and long-lasting conflict in Angola, which seems to have defied a final settlement and is still capable of erupting into violence.

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

The post-cold war explosion of United Nations peacekeeping operations has been well reflected by the number of such operations in the Central African subregion. There have been four operations; in Angola, Burundi, Chad and Rwanda. A fifth is being contemplated for the Central African Republic. Besides, the joint United Nations and OAU Special Representative for the Great Lakes was very active in the attempted mediator processes in Zaire when the Alliance of the Democratic Forces of Congo - Zaire launched its attack to dislodge the Mobutu regime, as well as in the Congo Republic during the armed conflict between the government of President Lissouba and the militias of Dennis Nguesso.

Causes of Conflicts

The causes of conflicts in the subregion as in other parts of the continent are many and need to be briefly examined, especially as Central Africa has witnessed some of the most extreme of the age-long antagonisms that have been responsible for post-independence conflicts in Africa. The postcolonial era has demonstrated the fragility of states, which were artificially created by the imperial powers. The resulting multi-ethnic states, which sometimes comprised ethnic groups with long precolonial rivalries, became vulnerable. The nature of the postcolonial pattern of governance further worsened the situation. The generalised prebendalist approach to politics whereby political power is seen as an access to the country’s resources for personal enrichment provoked the zero-sum political game.1 Since group well-being is seen to depend on access to political power by one of their own, to be in opposition is seen a fortiori as exclusion from the benefit of national resources. In the non-transparent and non-democratic environment of African politics, frustration with the impossibility of changing the government through the electoral process often led to armed insurgency as the only means to dislodge the ruling group. Even in the post-cold war era of democratisation, the holding of elections has not automatically ushered into most African countries an era of transparency, full respect for human rights and for rights of minorities.

Central Africa perhaps more than other subregions also witnessed the injection of the ideological competition to promote proxy local wars. Starting with the crisis in the Congo in the early 1960s, the ideological inflammation of crises in the subregion was particularly severe in the 1970s and 1980s when in addition to its own local problems, it was also used to play out the battle for and against the apartheid regime in South Africa. Part of the legacy of that period is the continued circulation of large quantities of arms that had been supplied to the region then. Light weapons and small arms, as has been aptly pointed out, have a long ‘shelf life’ since by their uncomplicated nature they require little maintenance.2 

Neighbourly Interventions

Another significant fall out from the cold war era is the legacy of reciprocal interference in each other’s internal affairs by states in the subregion. While the extreme case of aggression against a neighbouring state was apartheid South Africa’s incursions into Angola, Zaire under President Mobutu was known to be a close collaborator with successive American governments in the delivery of arms to Savimbi and his UNITA movement against the legitimate government of the MPLA of Angola. In the post-cold war era, President Mobutu collaborated with the French in support of one faction in the Rwandese crisis, and Zairean territory was used by Rwandese insurgents to launch attacks on that country after the take-over by the Rwandese Patriotic Front in 1994. It is also widely known that the Congo Republic under President Patrick Lissouba permitted UNITA to use the town of Pointe Noire as a supply base. Thus it was no surprise that about 1,000 Angolan troops joined the Cobra militia of Sassou Nguesso in its final assault on the forces of the then legitimate government of President Lissouba, which were ultimately routed. It was also no surprise that Rwandese troops were part and parcel of the forces led by Laurent Kabila that overran the forces of the government of President Mobutu.

These cross-border interventions have had a profound effect on another major factor of conflict generation in the subregion, namely the flow of arms. While it is a truism that arms by themselves do not necessarily cause conflicts, it is also a fact that their ready availability contribute to the intensity and duration of conflicts. Indeed, such ready availability, especially in quantities that can be guaranteed to insurgents by the government of a neighbouring state, often escalates what should be peaceful negotiations into armed conflicts.3 In describing internal conflicts in which small arms and light weapons are used, Evan Luard had made the same point that often the seriousness of such wars was hugely intensified by external interventions. In a few cases, he noted, external influence is mainly responsible for there being a war at all.4 

The situation of antagonism between neighbouring states in Central Africa creates an ideal environment for the free flow of arms. The lack of co-operation by the security outfits and border authorities facilitates the illicit movement of arms. When added to the lack of adequate national controls on imports due to the poor training of border and customs officials as well as widespread corruption among them, it should be no surprise that there has been such free flow of arms in the subregion. Though the small arms and light weapons, which are the instruments of death and destruction, originate from outside the subregion, their intra-subregional flow is quite significant. This is because of the circuitous routes deliberately charted by illicit arms dealers who take advantage of the large and porous borders as well as complicity of governments in funnelling arms into neighbouring states. Some of the arms dealers contrive to own citizenship in an African country and thus conduct part of their business from offices in Zaire, South Africa or Angola.5 It should be noted, moreover, that the original sources of supply have become vastly diversified since the end of the cold war. The main suppliers during the cold war era had been the major powers, particularly the superpowers, to their client states and sub-state actors. The end of the cold war, however, added a new dimension. The weapons that became surplus to the needs of the alliances were henceforth available for sale even by the smaller members of the alliances. As a result, the arms bazaar has acquired many sources of supply, fuelling the unrestrained acquisition by some governments for the suppression of their own people or for supporting other causes in neighbouring states, and also facilitating the acquisition of weapons by non-state entities.

The management of weapons in the post-conflict environment is already posing a great challenge to leaders in the subregion who are anxious to control the likely cycle of personal, national and subregional insecurity. Small arms and light weapons have already begun to show in the subregion the corrosive effect on civil society by the creation of the vicious circle between acute sense of personal insecurity and higher demand for this category of arms.6 They pose potent danger to the daily lives of people in a manner unimaginable by those who lived in the epicentre of the heydays of the superpower arms race. Besides their use for the high ideals which often motivate those who lead the various struggles in the subregion, small arms and light weapons are also the instruments used extensively by criminals and armed gangs to perpetuate their atrocities and thus create fears and uncertainties.

Economic and Social Consequences of
Arms Flow into the Subregion

The economic and social consequences of the accumulation of arms have been well documented, particularly in the expert study commissioned by the United Nations. While the focus of the study was the arms race of the superpowers and the two military alliances, the study nevertheless also touched on the effect on the developing countries of the cold war-induced regional arms races. In the Central African subregion the large inflow of small arms and light weapons has had profound effects which go beyond the immediate impact of the death and destruction caused by conflicts. The constant condition of instability in the most affected countries has been a major cause of their inability to build national structures of governance for the promotion of peace and security which are in turn necessary preconditions for sustainable development. According to the World Bank, armed conflict is responsible for the poverty of nearly half the population of Africa, at least 250 million people.7 These conflicts are responsible for the overwhelming number of refugees in Central Africa. They are also responsible for brutalising the children and very young people who are often not just the victims of wars, but also active participants through their recruitment into the fighting forces. It is obvious that if countries in Central Africa are to have any chance of realising sustainable economic and social development, they must first tackle the proliferation of arms, because so long as the weapons are in circulation, the potential for conflicts erupting or resuming will remain.

Subregional Economic Integration

Besides the impact at the national level, it is also noticeable that subregional co-operation is least developed in Central Africa. Since the creation of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) very little progress has been made in the promotion of regional economic integration. Indeed, ECCAS is hardly mentioned in the context of subregional economic groupings in Africa like ECOWAS and SADC. Without the formal structures of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC), which provide the background for subregional security mechanisms, Central Africa has had to resort to the creation of a United Nations-sponsored ad hoc structure.

Standing Advisory Committee on
Security Questions in Central Africa

In the absence of a mechanism to deal with subregional security issues, states in the Central African subregion requested the United Nations Secretary-General to set up a Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. Following General Assembly resolution A/res/46/37B of 6 Dec.1991, the Secretary-General set up the Standing Advisory Committee on 28 May 1992. Its aim is to enable the states to develop confidence-building measures, disarmament, and development in the subregion. Consisting of all the 11 states in the subregion, the Standing Advisory Committee has engaged in the development of measures in the field of preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-building. It has also arranged the training of personnel of its member states in peacekeeping activities to promote more active participation in peace operations.8 

Non-Aggression Pact

One significant project of the Standing Committee was its preparation in 1993 of a Non-Aggression Pact. It was signed at the first summit of the Heads of State and Government in Yaoundé in July 1996, by nine states. Angola and Rwanda have still not signed. In the pact, member states undertook to refrain in their mutual relations from the threat or use of force or aggression, and to settle their differences by peaceful means. Each party undertook to refrain from committing, encouraging, or supporting acts of hostility or aggression against other parties, and to ensure that acts of hostility or aggression are not committed from its territory by resident or non-resident aliens against other states parties. The pact is yet to come into force, not having been ratified by the required seven state parties.

Opportunity for Fresh Good-Neighbourly Co-operation

Regrettable as the most recent series of conflicts (as indeed the preceding ones) are, the consequential changes of the governments of Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congo Republic as well as the ongoing internal reconciliation moves in the Central African Republic with the assistance of the International Mission to monitor the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) have created a better background in which subregional states can tackle common security problems with a higher degree of transparency and good faith. For the time being, the bitter distrust between Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola and the Congo Republic, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the initial post-Mobutu distrust between the Congo Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are being replaced by more open and friendly relations between the governments of these countries. This development can lead to serious commitment to the implementation of the Non-Aggression Pact and thus give fresh impulse to the commencement of a credible programme for enhancing subregional security.

Central African Subregional Programme of Action

At the Yaoundé summit of July 1996, the Heads of States of Central Africa, in their final declaration expressed concern at the increased proliferation of weapons, a situ-ation which they characterised as a source of insecurity and a threat to the stability of states in the subregion. They declared their determination to arrest that development by establishing a disarmament programme with the assistance of the United Nations and the international community.

Confidence-Building Measures

A disarmament programme for Central Africa should be conceived as part of a comprehensive plan for the promotion of peace and security in the subregion, built on the consolidation of the era of friendliness which recent changes of governments of some of the countries in the subregion have ushered in. An indispensable starting point is the implementation by all countries and in good faith of the Non-Aggression Pact. It is necessary, therefore, that both Angola and Rwanda sign the pact, and that it be expeditiously ratified by all subregional states so that it can enter into force. Faithful adherence to its provisions, particularly those relating to the prohibition of acts of aggression or hostility from each other’s territory, will assure willingness to implement agreements on arms control and disarmament when these are adopted.

A second indispensable collateral measure is progress in the installation in each country in the subregion of the system of good governance. This entails the promotion of democratic structures, of transparency, openness, and inclusiveness. It is necessary to stress the attribute of inclusiveness in the African democratisation process because of the danger of the winner-takes-all approach of western democracy when applied in the as yet unconsolidated multi-ethnic states of Africa. Good governance also entails full respect for human rights and guarantee of equal opportunity to all citizens. These steps will attack the causes of weapons proliferation through what Chris Smith refers to as the ‘big’ solutions and the interlocking aspects of security.9 Such confidence-building measures between governments and their citizens will promote peace and participatory development, thus enhancing the prospects for stability. An additional collateral measure is the creation of a sub- regional security organ linked to a revamped ECCAS. The operations of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa should provide a basis for such a regionally based and owned mechanism which can complement the envisaged politically enhanced ECOWAS organ and the SADC organ for Politics, Defence and Security, as the catalysts for the effectiveness of the OAU Mechanism for Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts.

Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme

An important step in controlling weapons in the subregion is serious pursuit of demobilisation and reintegration programmes, which should be an essential element of every peace settlement. Where such programmes have succeeded, the country has reaped substantial peace dividend. A World Bank study showed that demobilisation and reintegration saved for Uganda more than 87 million dollars.10 Unfortunately, the experiences with other demobilisation and reintegration programmes have revealed problems such as inadequate and untimely funding, lack of prior planning and failure to see the whole process through. To correct these constraints on successful execution of the programmes, timely and adequate support of the international community and the international financial institutions is absolutely essential. This should be seen as the external component of measures towards the ‘big’ solutions to address the factors that provoke conflicts and make light weapons proliferation endemic.

A necessary complementary measure to prevent the reintroduction of fresh weapons is the enhancement of national capacities for effective and efficient border and customs control. Suggestions have been made for the use of a proportion of development assistance to build such capacities of police and customs/border officials and to provide support for judicial and legal systems.11 Definitely, the assistance of bilateral and multilateral donors will be crucial for success. At the subregional level, states must agree on measures to avert the uncontrolled cross-border flow of arms through close co-operation among border and customs authorities, constant exchange of information, especially on suspected movements of arms, and subregionally organised joint courses.

Subregional Arms Register

In order to enhance transparency and avert arms build-up which may be destined to foment conflicts in neighbouring states, the subregion should agree to create an Arms Register which will indicate current inventory of officially held weapons, as well as future importation. Such a register may eventually form part of, but not need wait for the creation of, an OAU Arms Register. All states that are known to be sources of arms flow into the subregion should be requested to subscribe to the register and to report on their arms export to the subregion as well as any information on illicit exports destined for the area. An essential element of the register should be the inclusion of reporting of the export and import of ammunitions. Though small arms and light weapons have long shelf life, many of them are dependent on constant supply of ammunitions, which do not have indefinite life span. Control of the inflow of ammunitions therefore will affect the use of these weapons.

Enquiry into the Sources of Illicit Arms Flow

In light of the uncertainties surrounding the sources of the large inflow of illicit arms into the subregion, it will be useful to commission a study on the subject with a view to taking informed and appropriate subregional measures as well as pressing for appropriate international measures. An initiative on such a study can be taken at the United Nations General Assembly, making use of UNIDIR to conduct the study.

Role of the United Nations

With the increasing reluctance of the United Nations’ Security Council’s permanent members to authorise any more peacekeeping operations in Africa, it is incumbent on them to enhance the capacity of the Organisation in assisting regional and subregional bodies to undertake preventive, peacekeeping and peace-building measures. Thus the countries of the Central Africa subregion as well as other subregions should be able to count on the support of the United Nations in their efforts to enhance peace and security in their area. The Organisation should pursue more urgently the possibility if establishing legally binding norms on the transfer of conventional weapons including, in particular, small arms and light weapons.

 

 

1 Emeka Nwokedi, African Security: Issues and Problems in the 1990s, Peacekeeping as Security Strategy in Africa. Eds. Vogt and Aminu, p. 29.

2 William Benson, ‘The European Arms Trade with the Horn of Africa and Central Africa’, Safeworld, February 1998, p.3.

3 Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms and Light Weapons. UN Doc. No. A/52/298.

4 Evan Luard, The Blunted Sword: The Erosion of Military Power in Modern World Politics, IS Taurus 1988.

5 ‘Burundi; Stoking the Fires’, Human Rights Watch, December 1997. Quoted in William Benson, Safeworld, February 1998.

6 Report of the Panel of Intergovernmental Experts on Small Arms and Light Weapons. UN Doc. A/52/298.

7 World Bank News, 18 July 1996.

8 United Nations Concern for Peace and Security in Central Africa. UN Doc. No. E 981X2.

9 C. Smith. Mentioned in Christopher Louise, The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation. UN Research Institute for Social Development, March 1995, p.20.

10 World Bank, Africa Analysis, 17 June 1996, quoted in William Benson, Safeworld, op.cit., p.46.

11William Benson, Safeworld, op. cit., p.11.

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