Moratoriums on Small Arms and Light Weapons:
Conceptualization and Application
to Central America

 

Edward J. Laurance

 

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, a series of mechanisms and institutions have been established through which the problems caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and major conventional weapons can be practically addressed. This has allowed the international community to turn its attention to an equally urgent matter, the hundreds of thousands of people who are being killed as a result of the proliferation, accumulation and unlawful use of small arms and light weapons.

The recent work of international organizations, national governments, NGOs and civil society has produced an emerging consensus that the internal conflicts now dominating the globe produce an unacceptable level of civilian casualties, disrupt economic, social and political development, and encourage violent solutions to conflict and the militarization of both civil society and governments. It is also clear that the problem is a global one requiring the attention of the international community.

This consensus has led to action. At the global level, the United Nations has gained considerable experience in dealing with light weapons as part of peace ope- rations, conducted official inquiries regarding the illicit acquisition of these weapons, and provided assistance to states suffering from the indiscriminate use of these weapons. For example, in October 1993 the government of Mali requested the UN Secretary-General to assist in the collection of light weapons proliferating in that country. The requested assistance was provided in the form of an Advisory Mission in August 1994, which issued its report to the Secretary-General in November 1994. In February/March 1995 the same advisory mission visited Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. The result has been a relatively successful turn-in and collection of weapons, as part of the successful resolution of the conflict between Mali and the Tuareg minority, as well as a demonstration of how disarmament and human development are linked.

In September 1997 the UN General Assembly received report from an experts panel on the nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulations and transfer of these weapons, which concluded with a number of recommendations for action. The UN ECOSOC Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice conducted a fifty-country study on firearm regulation and conducted four regional hearings on a proposed set of principles which could lead to reduction in casualties from firearms.

The campaign to ban anti-personnel land mines resulted in the signing of a treaty by more than 120 countries and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the NGO International Campaign to Ban Land Mines. This success has demonstrated that a weapons-specific focus can galvanize public and governmental support to alleviate human suffering.

At the regional level, in November 1997 the Organization of American States agreed to a Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials. In June 1997 the European Union agreed to an EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms. At the national level, many countries have implemented a wide variety of programs to address the negative effects of the availability and indiscrimi- nate use of these weapons. These include programs to enhance border controls, improve registration and licensing procedures, improve security of weapons storage sites, and develop voluntary weapons collection and destruction programs.

 

NGOs have also been active, creating networks of scholars and activists, producing case studies of both effects and solutions, engaging in field work that has resulted in the illumination of negative effects and illicit arms acquisition, and hosting workshops that bring together governments, NGOs and civil society. More recently the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) was launched in December 1997. In January 98 a web site, the Preparatory Committee for a Campaign on Small Arms and Light Weapons (Prep Com) was launched for the purpose of bringing together a critical mass of NGOs on this issue.1 

In the aforementioned UN Small Arms Panel report, the experts specifically addressed the concept of a moratorium as one of the policy tools available to deal with the problems associated with these weapons. The panel recommended that ‘(i) The United Nations should encourage the adoption and implementation of regional or subregional moratoriums, where appropriate, on the transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons, as agreed upon by the States concerned’.2 While this reference was made with the effort to create such a moratorium in West Africa in mind, no attempt was made to operationalize the concept. It is to this task that we now turn, testing its applicability to the region of Central America.

The Concept of a Moratorium

The dictionary definition for moratorium is ‘a deferment or delay of any action’. Other ways to state this concept include suspension, reprieve, respite, halt, stay, postponement, cessation, abeyance, standstill and letup. In arms control history, the concept has been formally used in conjunction with suspending the testing of nuclear weapons. As for conventional weapons, there have been several attempts by supplier states to ‘defer or delay’ arms shipments to specific countries and regions but without formally using the concept of a moratorium, which has the distinct flavor of temporary action while something else takes place. Moratorium-like events that come to mind include: the restricting of supplies to the Middle East by the UK, France and the U.S. from 1950–55; COCOM; and the treaty ending the war in Vietnam, where the ‘two South Vietnamese parties agreed not to accept the introduction of armaments, munitions, and war materiel into South Vietnam, except as required for periodic replacement on a piece-for-piece basis of items that were destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up after the cease-fire’.3 

Also relevant to this conceptual review are those few efforts taken by recipient states to restrict the flow of conventional arms into their region. There was a short-lived attempt in 1974 by eight Andean states, the Declaration of Ayachuco, which called for conditions for an effective limitation of arms. It failed for the well-known reasons, that states could not agree on basic collective security questions and the Cold War protagonist suppliers were not about to stop exporting weapons for political purposes. The CFE treaty is an agreement among recipients that has been successful in lowering levels of armaments, but would not be seen as a delay or deferment. In sum, what history there is on recipient states voluntarily agreeing to halt or postpone arms acquisitions and production to their region is rare and related to larger conventional weapons. This history holds few lessons for the current international environment for several reasons. First, controlling larger conventional weapons is fraught with all of the well-known problems which have prevented any meaningful arms control action throughout history. Second, this class of weapon is no longer utilized in most of the internal conflicts raging throughout the world, as cross-border traditional wars have been replaced by internal conflicts. Third, it is small arms and light weapons which are actually killing and injuring the civilians, ninety percent of all casualties in today’s conflict. This class of weapon presents a different set of problems for moratoriums, since they are distributed more widely through societies, readily available, easier to export illicitly, and do not lend themselves to transparency. These weapons are at the heart of every country’s national security establishment, and cannot be dealt with by using the traditional tools of disarmament and arms control.

Given the lack of precedent for moratoriums in general, and the specific challenge of constructing such an arrangement with the very weapons needed for every country’s security, it was encouraging that in November 1996 twelve West African countries launched the idea of putting such an instrument in place. This moratorium would be a declaratory measure of a specific duration, which could be extended, to cease the import, export and manufacture of light weapons.

Criteria for a Successful Moratorium

The feasibility or success of the West African or any other moratorium that is proposed will depend on a critical set of factors

 

Goals

A moratorium must have a goal that can be achieved as a result of the moratorium being put in place. As an example the stated goal in the West African case is to ‘create a framework within which a secure environment for socio-economic development can be obtained’. This goal is common to other regions, and is analogous to the recent land mine campaign. The de-miners wanted a treaty that would stop the production, use and export of land mines, lest the de-mining and subsequent development efforts be useless in the face of more land mines being deployed. There may be more immediate goals, such as mopping up weapons after a peace process, creating incentives for the non-use and/or non-possession of such weapons, stopping conflicts, or prevent such conflicts from occurring in the first place.

Inherent in such goals is the causal link between implementing the moratorium and a reduction of the violence that has disrupted and prevented the desired development. This causal link must be realistic, i.e., there must be some consensus that the weapons are a big part of the problem. It may be enough to agree that a moratorium may not guarantee the achievement of a goal like that of the West African case, but without it nothing can proceed in the way of development. It is not necessary that all states agreeing to implement the moratorium have identical goals. But at a minimum these goals must be seen as complementary.

 

Level of integration among moratorium states

The success of the moratorium is also dependent on how well integrated the states are on several dimensions. Geography is important. Are the states contiguous? Are there distinct boundaries between the ‘region’ of the moratorium and neighboring ‘regions’? This will be important in implementing the mechanics of any moratorium. How similar are their governments, political and economic systems, and socio-economic situation? Are they of similar size or does one large country dominate the region? Do the states share a common history that would promote cooperation in general? This is particularly critical for the history of the armed forces in each state. Does cooperative behavior exist in non-security sectors?

 

Demand for small arms and light weapons

A moratorium will be more successful the more the states share a common set of demands for weapons. For example, it would be difficult for State A to sign on to a moratorium if it was the only one with a high level of conflict among groups within its borders. The same would be true for other demand factors such as the presence of either drug use, dealing or trafficking routes, or high levels of crime creating a demand for weapons to protect one’s life and property. To the extent that root causes of violence such as poverty, repression and inequality are roughly equal among the moratorium states, the chances for success improve. States can also vary widely in terms of the presence of a gun culture. Here too some semblance of balance among states will make a moratorium more likely to succeed. It will be critical to assess the relative security of each of the members.

 

Quantity, quality, distribution, controls and
use of small arms and light weapons

Critical to the success of a moratorium is the commonality among those factors directly related to the weapons themselves. One criterion for success will be that the moratorium does not hurt one state excessively more than the others. This will require an assessment of the rough military balance between them, and the ability of each state to maintain internal security with the weapons in their inventory. States, which have distributed arms during a civil war, will have more available for illicit acquisition once a moratorium is in effect. States more dependent than others for outside supply of operational items such as ammunition may be more resistant to the moratorium and its implementation than the state with plentiful stocks. Finally, the capacity for secure storage of these weapons, and the level of corruption among military and police forces which control them, will be important. It would be tragic if the import and export of weapons was halted, only to be recirculated in the region by corrupt officials.

 

Exceptions for legitimate defense needs

A successful moratorium will be one that takes into account the changing security needs of states, as well as the natural evolution of weapons stocks. In the West African case, if a participating state ‘finds that it has a legitimate need for new weapons in the course of the moratorium period, it would have to give prior notification to the consultative mechanism’. Weapons wear out, stocks can be depleted through training, or a threat unknown at the inauguration of the moratorium can emerge. A moratorium must be able to survive these challenges.

 

Capacity to execute and implement the moratorium

The success of a moratorium will depend critically on a set of factors related to the states’ capacity to implement the moratorium. The presence of operating institutions among the moratorium states will significantly enhance the likelihood of success, given positive indicators on the other dimensions mentioned above. Even without such institutions, political will and a set of situational factors predicting towards success may result in the creation of an institution that may well succeed in fostering implementation. In this case such an institution will need resources for the techno-logy training and personnel required.

The Case of central america

 

 

Overview of the small arms and light weapons situation

The Central America states of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama are awash with small arms and light weapons in the millions. A majority of these weapons are not under government control. The weapons are military-style weapons, such as assault rifles, hand grenades, rocket launchers and mortars, originally designed for use by state-controlled armed forces.

These weapons poured into the region from a variety of sources in the 1970s and 1980s, due mainly to the basic tensions produced by the Cold War. Major sources included:

v United States (all governments in the region and the Contras)

v Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries (Nicaragua, oppositionist forces such as the FSLN and FMLN)

v Israel (Nicaragua, Guatemala)

v Vietnam (U.S. weapons left over from the Vietnam War)

v Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (via Cuba)

v Cuba (major conduit for Soviet bloc weapons).

While some weapons still flow into this region from the United States, the major acquisition mode is one of diffusion and circulation within the region. Much of this trade is illicit. This illicit or black-market trade is enhanced by the globalization of the economy, making it easier to ship goods of any kind more easily.

The illicit circulation of these weapons is highly correlated to the drug trade in three ways.

v Colombia and other South American states are a major source of drugs for the U.S. market. Central America is a major thoroughfare for this traffic. It is estimated that 43% of the South American cocaine exported by air transits Central America. Guatemala has over 3,000 airstrips available for this purpose. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that at any given time 50 tons of cocaine is awaiting transport to Mexico by land, sea or air.4  Given that the drug trafficking network is illegal and under attack from legitimate governments, weapons are essential to the members of this network. Much of the armed conflict taking place in the Central American states is related to drug trafficking.

v The clandestine networks developed for the drug trade is now being used for weapons as well.

v The billions of dollars in drug money acquired in this region means that money is no object in acquiring the weapons needed to maintain the trade. In addition, this attracts illegal weapons dealers both in the region and internationally. The drug cartels have become major importers of light weapons.

The terrain of this region is characterized by naturally porous borders. For example, the border between Guatemala and Mexico has one stretch of 480 kilometers of jungle. There is practically no surveillance of the El Salvador–Guatemala and Honduras–El Salvador borders, mainly due to the difficult terrain. The many clandestine airstrips and small ports in the region add to the difficulty of monitoring and controlling illicit trade in drugs and weapons.

The demand for weapons by these new types of actors – street gangs, drug cartels, etc. – has seen an increase in attacks on state arsenals, armed forces and police, for the purpose of acquiring weapons. There are also lingering political conflicts in Nicaragua and Guatemala that also create an incentive to use this source of supply.

Countries in this region suffer from an underdeveloped justice system, including inadequate numbers of uncorrupt and efficient police and ineffective judicial systems. These countries in this region also suffer from serious economic problems. Three of them – Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua – are just emerging from periods of war and violence that wrecked havoc on their citizens.

The region is also characterized by the presence of a gun culture, or as a Mexican official put it, a ‘fondness for guns’. This culture predates and has been exacerbated by the recent upsurge in small arms and light weapons in this region.

 

Problems resulting from the excessive accumulation and
availability of small arms and light weapons

v Criminal acts with military-style weapons. In Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and increasingly Costa Rica, the increased availability of military-style light weapons has made crime the number one social problem. Car hijacking, kidnapping, assaults, robberies and trafficking of contraband are commonplace. The increase in lethality that comes with military-style weapons has emboldened criminals, who often are better armed than police or military forces.

v Promotion of violent solutions to conflicts. The widespread abundance of weapons in this class results in violence often being the first option for conflict resolution, frustrating efforts to restore peace, lawfulness and stability in a non-violent manner. Disputes such as those over land, economic inequality and human rights are increasingly settled by use of force. In Guatemala the distribution of arms to the Civilian Patrols in Guatemala (20,000 weapons to 400,000 people) has resulted in a preference for solving problems by force, a process that the United Nations and the government of Guatemala is finding difficult to reverse. This has also been termed ‘mental militarization’, where violent responses to social problems are the norm.

v Arming of private citizens and development of private security groups. The above two problems have led to a ‘cycle of violence’ in which citizens protect themselves either with their own arms or hire one of an increasing number of private security organizations. In Guatemala over 4,500 neighborhood groups have emerged, as well as 33 authorized and 115 unauthorized private security groups.5  In 1992 Guatemala loosened its gun possession laws so that more citizens could protect themselves. The sheer number of such weapons in the hands of individuals complicates any solution based on disarmament by voluntary weapons collection.

v Emboldening the disaffected. A common characteristic of this region is economic deprivation and inequitable development. The availability of arms has allowed citizens disaffected and impatient for promised progress to use weapons for a variety of purposes, including crime, protection, or commercial purposes.

v Threat to democratic political development. Most states in this region are either trying to nurture a new democratic political system (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua) or trying to prevent their system from declining into an authoritarian state. The cycle of violence and the growing and omnipresent gun culture have allowed and in some cases fostered the increased use of state violence and repression. This threatens to lead to either the development of or turn to violence by oppositionist forces, just when such forces have been disbanded (e.g., Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala).

v Economic development stalled or threatened. The increasing violence in this region has seen economic development projects either canceled or postponed. One reason is insecurity, in that assets supplied to recipient states are confiscated by criminal activities. Another factor is that crime and violence disrupt the infrastructure needed for such projects, e.g., roads and public transportation. In addition this lack of security and the need for the state to respond with security forces, means that fewer resources are available for development and increasingly states cannot meet the basic needs of its people.

v Increasing harm to civilians. All of the above consequences have impacted mostly on civilians, in two ways. First, the number of people killed and injured from armed violence has increased significantly in the past few years. In El Salvador the number is estimated at 20,000 since the peace was signed in 1992, a rate higher than during the war itself. In addition to the number of civilians affected, the lethality of the weapons insures that the injuries are more severe, creating huge strains on the health care systems of most countries in the region.

 

Options for Action

It is clear that the availability of small arms and light weapons in Central America has created serious obstacles as these countries attempt to advance their economic, social and political development. This is particularly tragic in this region since three states – Nicaragua in 1991, El Salvador in 1992, and Guatemala in 1996 – have successfully ended civil wars and put in place democratic political systems. With the end of the Cold War superpower competition ended and with it the end of any serious external threats to the region. The violence perpetrated with these weapons threatens to reverse this progress, and certainly prevents significant movement forward.

 

Action at the national level

Given their lack of resources, and the decline in international political interest since the end of the Cold War, states acting on their own have found it difficult to mount successful campaigns and policies to deal with the effects of these weapons. Despite a formal disarmament component in each of the three UN-brokered peace processes, weapons abound and remain very available. Both El Salvador and Nicaragua have developed voluntary weapons collection programs (goods for guns) but lack the funds to widen their scope and, more importantly, mount national campaigns which link these programs to economic and social development. For the first time in recent history Costa Rica has felt the impact of these weapons and has developed a national weapons collection program, which awaits governmental approval. The porous borders of this region, and years of free-flowing weapons traffic have created norms that make national solutions challenging.

 

The Organization of American States

All of the Central American countries are members of the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS has begun to address the problem of arms and conflict from two different perspectives. First, the Inter-American Drug Abuse and Control Commission of the OAS is developing model regulations for the control of the smuggling of weapons and explosives and its linkage to drug trafficking in the Inter-American region. A second OAS initiative is the signing in November 1997 of a Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials, signed in November 1997. The convention requires each OAS state to establish a national firearms control system and a register of manufacturers, traders, importers and exporters of these commodities. It also calls for the establishment of a national body to interact with other states and an OAS advisory committee. It also calls for the standardization of national laws and procedures within the OAS, and ensuring effective control of borders and ports.

While this treaty is very welcome, there are several reasons why it will have mini- mal effect on Central America in the short run. First, to a large extent Central America is a transit zone. If the effort to combat the drug problem is concentrated at the supply and demand ends of the chain, few resources will be applied to this region except to halt this traffic. Second, this treaty is all about illicit trafficking. It does not address the legal trade, which in many cases is responsible for some of the negative effects described above. For example, it will not address actions by states which exacerbate the problems, such as distributing arms to irresponsible private security organizations, or para-militaries with scores to settle. Most importantly, the OAS includes the United States. Any arms-related actions will invariably involve U.S. national interests, especially the domestic politics related to the gun control debate in the U.S. To the extent that the U.S. has an interest in arms exports to the region, this will also have an impact on how Central America deals with this problem through the OAS.

 

Demilitarization

With the end of the Cold War, the effort to demilitarize Central America became a possible option. Costa Rica has long been without an army, and the efforts to mili- tarize their police force during the l980s have been reversed. Panama has now disbanded its army as well. The elimination of armies in this region has been the goal of Oscar Arias, Nobel Peace Prize winner and former president of Costa Rica.6 

The argument for developing civilian security institutions is based on the assumption that democratic states want security and civilian control over the military they create. Since security now exists for the most part in Central America, the only question is how to achieve civilian control. Some states are resisting change or reforming slowly (Guatemala and Honduras). Others have experienced peace pro-cesses (El Salvador and Nicaragua) which have led to military reductions, civilian control measures and collective security based on military cooperation. A third route to civilian control is the abolition of militaries and collective security based on civilian cooperation (Costa Rica, Panama). This last option can be accomplished by redefining security as human security, consolidating democracy, using institutions such as the Central American Security Commission or some new institution, providing for effective demobilization of soldiers, strengthening national and regional police, and new emphases in U.S. policy.7 

Proponents of the demilitarization concept appreciate the resistance from professional militaries in this region, and the elites closely associated with them. It has long been the dominant political culture in this region that militaries have been the ultimate guarantor of security. Because crime and violence with military weapons have increased recently, the movement towards this option has not moved forward very quickly.

 

The moratorium option

The situation with regard to addressing the problems of the availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons appears to be as follows. There is a recognition that this situation is hampering efforts to develop this region economically and politically. But no state by itself has the resources to deal with the problem, which in any case is regional in scope, if not global. The OAS effort is a promising framework but only deals with illicit trafficking and production and must take into account states not from the region, especially the United States. While the argument for demilitarization is persuasive, the rising level of armed violence, while not based on purely political conflicts, has prevented militaries from turning the security function over to civilians and has pushed the military to take on new functions related to human security. It appears that this region may be ripe for an interim measure related to lowering the availability of weapons through some sort of deferment or delay of weapons export, import, acquisition or production. With this in mind, a proposal for a moratorium is outlined and evaluated below.

v Nature of a moratorium. Given the traditional role of the military in this region, the moratorium should focus only on those weapons causing the threats to human security. This would be small arms and light weapons, not the tanks, artillery and aircraft that some of the militaries still retain either as a mark of sovereignty or for potential external threats. Little production of weapons exists in this region, although there are some assault rifle production facilities and several ammunition plants. While overall budgets have declined, militaries still acquire new weapons, even if for modernization. Some militaries are pushing for an enhanced role in human security and may be asking for new light weapons for this function. A moratorium would require them to make do with current inventories. One complication in this region is that the United States is engaged in a major drug interdiction effort, which involves exporting weapons to militaries involved in this effort. Any moratorium would also build on the provisions of the OAS treaty already in place.

v Goals of a moratorium. As with West Africa, the overarching goal would be creating an environment for socio-economic development. While the histories of these states vary somewhat, the fact that three of them have experienced an end to civil wars provides a commonality that is promising, i.e., there is little disagreement on the need for socio-economic development. There is also an emerging consensus that the accomplishment of this goal would be enhanced through a reduction in the availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Working against this commonality is that each state may choose a different route to socio-economic development. This is especially true of Nicaragua, where the debate centering on the negative aspects of ‘neo-liberalism’ continues. Any moratorium, especially associated measures such as weapons collection, must take these differences into account. The states would also agree on the overall goal of getting weapons out of the hands of criminal gangs and drug cartels. It is true that states would be free to purchase major conventional weapons, thereby using scarce resources needed for development. However, a strong commitment to development, backed by increased demands from civil society, would make such acquisitions less likely.

v Level of integration among moratorium states. The geography of the region lends itself to the success of a moratorium. In the south there is a natural division, with Colombia experiencing major internal war and not a likely candidate for participation in a regional moratorium. This is not to say that arms exports across this boundary are not a problem. The same can be said for the northern boundary of the region. Mexico is not part of Central America, although the conflict in Chiapas on the Guatemalan and Belize border is fueled somewhat by arms from Central America. Working against the success of any regional effort are the porous borders and the numerous airstrips and small ports that can handle large quantities of small arms and light weapons and are all but invisible given current resources.

The similarity of these countries with regard to size, history and political system (emerging democracies) in the region also contributes to a level of integration conducive to a successful moratorium effort. While the militaries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are more reluctant than others to reduce their role in society, they all agree that traditional national security concerns (external threats) are mini- mal at this point. They also share a common interest in dealing with the current instability associated with the availability and circulation of small arms and light weapons. Since the Contadora and Esquipulas processes began in the late 1980s, the states of Central America now cooperate with each other on a variety of issues at unprecedented levels.

v Demand for small arms and light weapons. The demand for small arms and light weapons among the militia and police forces of these states is fairly equal and low. Unfortunately most all of the states have to deal with drug trafficking and its associated requirement for weapons. Also, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala have undergone downsizing as a result of the peace processes, with many very serviceable weapons and associated ammunition put in storage. All states are equally hard pressed for resources to deal with roughly equal human security problems. As for comparative gun cultures, some unevenness occurs on this dimension, although even this is changing as the right to carry a military weapon is being offset by the magnitude of the growing violence in the region.

v Quantity, quality, distribution, control and use of weapons. Any moratorium put into effect in Central America is unlikely to hurt one state more than any other. Stocks are plentiful for identified threats, the modernity and quality is roughly equal, and larger weapons that carry some prestige value are not included in the moratorium. While some militaries may occasionally speak of imbalances in the region, these are rare occurrences. On the contrary, militaries in this region have recognized that a basic level of security exists, and have been pushing for new missions related to human security as a route to continued existence and involvement. There is significant cooperation among countries on military matters. A ‘soccer war’ in the current environment is highly unlikely. States in this region do vary on the important dimension of corruption and unlawful behavior in their police and military forces. This will be a problem in countries like Nicaragua and Guatemala, where citizens will be reluctant to participate in any associated measures such as weapons collection which will result in a monopoly of force resting with those who would repress or abuse their human rights. This reinforces the point that any moratorium must be closely linked with socio-economic development, lest the result be citizens worse off than before the moratorium.

A factor that works against the success of a moratorium is the fact that there is little production and import of small arms and light weapons in the region, mainly due to the extensive supplies from the Cold War period still circulating in the region or in storage. In other words, it may be too easy for states to comply with a moratorium. Any proposal for a moratorium should be preceded by a declaration (not ne-cessarily public) as to stocks, to get some idea as to how equal the burden (and ease of compliance) will be.

v Exceptions for legitimate defense needs. The improved nature of military-to-military relations in the recent period should insure that states could sign on to a moratorium with assurances that their legitimate modernization or unpredicted security needs could be handled by a consultative mechanism.

v Capacity to execute and implement a moratorium. Unlike the previous era dominated by outside powers, in recent years the states of this region have worked hard to develop region-specific institutions. Some of these are directly related to the weapons problem, like the Central American Security Commission (CASC). Long before the OAS treaty was developed, in 1992 the CASC developed a Draft Regional Agreement for Mutual Legal Assistance With Respect to Illegal Trafficking in Weapons.

In 1995 the governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama signed the framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America. This treaty has sections on the Rule of Law, Security of Individuals and Their Property, and Regional Security. It also establishes a Security Commission, which contains a Central American Security Information and Communication Mechanism. It calls for a ‘regime of periodic reports and a system for registering weapons and the transfer of weapons,’ as well as information on foreign military advisers and budgets.

As for the criminal aspect of weapons, these same governments signed the Central American Treaty on the Recovery and Return of Stolen, Appropriated or Illicitly Retained Vehicles. This treaty signals regional cooperation that could be turned toward weapons in a moratorium effort. This is further evidence that a high level of institutional development resides in the region.

Overall Assessment of a Central American Moratorium Option

As an illustration of how one might bring together the above analysis, the following chart depicts a very rough and preliminary rating for the likelihood of success on each of the dimensions. (The ratings for other regions are left to the reader.) The Central American region is strongest on institutional capacity, and more than meets the minimum requirements with regard to goals, level of integration, demand and the ability of the states to agree on exceptions. There is less support on the dimensions of the quantity and quality of weapons in the region. The large numbers of weapons circulating or stored in the region do not provide a natural incentive for these states to use a moratorium per se as the instrument by which they will address the agreed upon problems associated with the availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, something must be done with regard to the drug problem, where some states have agreements to cooperate with the U.S., cooperation that may include the transfer of arms.

This paper has made an argument in favor of some sort of policy initiative that can galvanize Central American states to begin to deal with the problems associated with small arms and light weapons. A moratorium meets some of the requirements of such a policy, in that it is directly related to the weapons themselves and is of a duration designed to spur specific action described in the goals of the moratorium. Given the weapons environment in the region, it would also be easy enough for states to comply for a year or two with minimal burdens. It would not satisfy those advocating a demilitarized Central America but it would give all parties experience that might lead to a reassessment of that option.

Central West Central Caribbean America Africa Africa States

Shared Goals ++

Level of Integration ++

Demand ++

Weapons Environment -

Exceptions ++

Institutional Capacity +++

 

A moratorium would be the appropriate instrument if it were coupled with a regional effort to simultaneously: l) create new norms regarding the possession and use by civilians of military-style weapons; 2) conduct an all-out well-funded effort to mop up the weapons left over from the wars of the 1980s; and 3) insure that the legitimate owners of these weapons, the military and police forces, use them with due respect for human rights and in accordance with international humanitarian law.

 

The author is Director of the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion (PACDC) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. In the past several years PACDC has conducted field research in Central America and Haiti on weapons collection programs. Prof. Laurance was also the consultant to the United Nations Panel of Experts on Small Arms, which held hearings in El Salvador in January 1997.

 

1 The accelerating number of activities at the national, regional and global levels, including the NISAT, which address the problems associated with small arms and light weapons, are listed and described on the Prep Com web site. The address of the web site is http:/www.prep.com. org.

2 Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. Report # A/52/298/ from the Secretary-General to the UN General Assembly (New York: United Nations; 27 August I997), p. 23.

3 Barton, John H. and Lawrence D. Weller (Eds.), International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 284–285.

4 Cristopher Louise, Light Weapons Proliferation in Central America: A Preliminary Report on the Militarisation of Civil Society in El Salvador, Guatemala and Chiapas. Prepared for the British American Security Information Council’s Project on Light Weapons. July 1996.

5 Ibid.

6 The major work on the demilitarization option is by Adam Isacson, Altered states: Security and Demilitarization in Central America (1997). A Joint Project of the Center for International Policy (Washington) and the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress (Costa Rica). Much of the following assessment is based on this work

7 Ibid., Chapter 7: ‘What Can Be Done?’

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