A Moratorium on Light Weapons
in West Africa

 

Sverre Lodgaard & Ivor Richard Fung

1. Definitions

There are no generally agreed definitions of small arms and light weapons. However, the ones that are being used contain some common elements¹

First, the focus is on lethal equipment, i.e., weapons and their ammunition, generally used by military and paramilitary forces, excluding items such as knives and hunting rifles. Second, the emphasis is on weapons that are man-portable or transportable by light vehicles, i.e., on the weight and size of the equipment. Third, this equipment is easy to maintain, can function without much logistical back-up, and requires little training for use. Fourth, to be militarily and politically relevant, the definition comprises weapons that are in frequent use, i.e., ‘weapons that really kill’.

In short, these are weapons that are man-portable or transportable by light vehicles and that do not require much in terms of service, logistical back-up or training. The relevance of the definition has to be ensured through properly up-dated operationalizations.

The moratorium proposal for West Africa is based on an operationalization offered by the Bonn International Center for Conversion, drawing on a categorization used by Jane’s Information Systems.2 Small arms comprises pistols, rifles, sub-machine-guns, machine-guns and ammunition for them. In addition to small arms, the wider category of light weapons comprises small-caliber cannons, light support weapons, combat grenades, anti-personnel mines, mortars, anti-tank weapons, anti-tank mines, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and their ammunition. So far, it has been assumed that the West African moratorium would impose a temporary ban on light weapons.3 However, the scope of the moratorium is ultimately for the participating states to decide. A tentative listing and technical specification of such weapons were agreed upon at the high-level consultation in Bamako in March 1997 (cf. 4.2., and Appendix).

2. Objectives

Why is it important to curb the proliferation of light weapons in a region like West Africa? What is the purpose?

Three objectives are of particular import. One of them is conflict prevention.

To have a fair chance of success, strategies of conflict prevention and post-conflict consolidation have to be comprehensive. Six components should be considered whenever such a strategy is being devised, though not all of them will necessarily be relevant to every situation. They are: (1) ‘security first’; (2) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; (3) repatriation and reintegration of refugees; (4) rule of law and respect for human rights; (5) democratization; and (6) socio-economic development. The problems posed by small arms are addressed in a general way in (1) and in a more specific way in (2).4 

Another objective is to pave the way for socio-economic development in general, and for donor-supported development projects in particular. The latter are particularly sensitive to incidents of violence. A fundamental condition for development in any country is that an adequate level of security is maintained by the state.

This is the idea underlying the ‘security first’ approach. Without security, conditions will not exist for development programmes to be conducted. It is therefore important to convince donors that in many countries, part of the development aid may best be invested in a more effective law and order mechanism to be developed under international supervision. It is only when functional substitutes are offered for the role that weapons now play that incentive schemes to collect arms can work well. And it is only when arms have been brought under control and the security environment has become stable that development programmes can be conducted. Hence the quest for an integrated and proportional approach to security and development – in short, ‘security first’.5 

The third objective is to come to grips with crime and banditry. This is often a big problem in weak states where civil society is poorly developed and the social fabric is in dismal condition. Furthermore, it is almost a law of nature that when internal wars come to an end, there is a burst of crime and banditry in the aftermath.

What is more important in this connection: the human beings/combatants or the weapons that they carry? Is it more important to address the humans behind the gun than to eliminate the material vehicles of violence? The question is often raised. However, as is so often the case, it is not a matter of either/or:both are important. Many other factors can also help reduce the crime and banditry that disrupt so many societies.6 

If there is a lot of arms around, easy access to weapons may invite violent solutions to problems and, per implication, acquisition of arms for self-defence since there may be no effective police to rely upon. The proliferation of arms breeds cultures of violence. If arms are carried at public places, it tends to stimulate violent behaviour. If a peace operation deployed to a country in conflict winds up before measures have been taken to control the flow of arms, post-conflict reconstruction may be jeopardized.7 

3. Regional Approaches

Some countries see international efforts to come to grips with the proliferation of light weapons as interference into their domestic affairs and, therefore, something they cannot go along with. They are afraid that their sovereignty may be compromised. This is not difficult to understand, since monopoly on the physical means of control goes to the core of what states are about. For instance, states in South Asia see it this way.

In many parts of Africa, governments take the opposite view. Here, efforts to mop up light weapons and curb illicit flows of arms are seen as a welcome contribution to the (re)construction of states, and something that may help them establish real sovereignty.

The scope for universal, global efforts to bring light weapons under control is therefore limited. Different from a specific, neatly defined type of weapon like anti-personnel land mines, light weapons are a much wider category involving a variety of interests. Obviously, these interests vary a great deal from region to region. Therefore, regional approaches should be pursued where conditions are ripe while sensitizing more countries to the issues involved. In the regions of Africa and in Central America, regional arrangements can do much to improve the situation.

Regional measures are based on the premise that the state will continue to be the main organizing unit in international affairs. The state is not an old phenomenon, and it is an open question how long it will last. In a globalizing world, many of them seem to be on the decline. However, in recent years we have seen the chaos and misery that erupts when states collapse. Until further notice, the international community has no better choice than to build on the state in its efforts to enhance security and reduce violence around the globe.

It should be noted that national agendas may have important regional ramifications. Following cease-fire agreements, arms tend to flow into other countries. In Africa, it is well known that arms tend to move around following the ebb and flow of conflicts. If national efforts to collect and eliminate arms are successful, it may come to a point where the prices of arms go up and international arms dealers move in to reap profits. In situations where borders are porous and states are generally weak, disarmament measures are critically dependent on regional commitments to control cross-border traffic. Single states are usually too vulnerable to go it alone. National programmes should be anchored in regional undertakings.

4. A Moratorium on Light Weapons

4.1. Design

A moratorium on light weapons has not been tried before. Neither has the recipients of arms been in the habit of seizing non-proliferation initiatives: nearly all initiatives to control and constrain the transfer of weapons have been taken by supplier states. The West African initiative is a novel one in both respects.

Another novel feature of this initiative is the invitation that the West Africans have extended to the members of the Wassenaar Arrangement of supplier states. The suppliers are asked to respect the provisions of the moratorium and to assist in its implementation.8 This has the virtue of locking suppliers and recipients into a joint effort to alleviate the problems.

It should be noted that the moratorium would define a ban on all import, export and manufacture of light weapons without any particular reference to illicit activities. Illicit arms would be addressed, specifically, by associated measures.

 

4.2. Origin

The moratorium originated from a succession of events and initiatives over the 1993–97 period.

Acting upon an initial request from the President of Mali, the United Nations Secretary-General established an advisory mission on the control and collection of small arms in the Sahara-Sahel region. The mission visited Mali (1994) as well as Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal (1995).

A major lesson from these missions was that curbing the dissemination of small arms within each country and throughout the region was an essential factor in establishing the minimal security prerequisites for future development efforts to be undertaken effectively.

Hence, an integrated and proportional approach to security and development (‘security first’) was elaborated and endorsed at a high-level consultation of the UN/UNDP and donor countries held in New York on 21 October 1996.9 

In this spirit, a UNIDIR/UNDP conference on conflict prevention, disarmament and development in West Africa was convened in Bamako on 25–29 November 1996. Delegations from 12 West African countries sought common ground on options for future regional cooperation. The idea of a moratorium on imports, exports and manufacturing of light weapons drew particular interest throughout the conference. Delegates undertook to convey the suggestion to their respective governments for further consideration.

As participants in the Bamako Conference, both ECOWAS and ANAD took an active part in the discussions on the moratorium idea. Subsequently, the secretariat of the OAU was briefed on the proposal.

In February 1997, Friends of the Chair of the Wassenaar Arrangement were likewise informed of the moratorium proposal, and of the West African wish to conduct a dialogue on the matter.

Another consultation of West African countries held in Bamako in March 1997, attended, i.a., by a representative of the Chairman in Office of the Wassenaar Arrangement in an observer capacity, agreed that the moratorium might be of a three-year duration.

In a public statement of 10 December 1997, the Wassenaar Arrangement ‘welcomed and encouraged the initiative of the West African countries in establishing a moratorium on import, export and manufacture of light weapons’.10 

In its communiqué of 12 March 1998, the ECOWAS meeting of foreign ministers held in Abidjan instructed the ECOWAS secretariat to prepare a draft text for the declaration of the moratorium proposal with a view to its adoption and announcement at the upcoming summit of ECOWAS. If the preparations proceed in professional fashion, and the necessary political consultations are conducted without delay, a genuine opportunity now exists for the countries of West Africa to make an innovative contribution to security and development in the region.

5. Modalities

Initially, the moratorium would be a declaratory measure of a three-year duration. Towards the end of the declared period, a consultative meeting may be called to consider an extension of the moratorium.

Measures should be taken to make it as effective as possible. Controls at harbours, airports and borders should be improved. The Wassenaar states may assist in this respect. Under West African conditions – with some very long borders that are seldom patroled – a strictly controlled moratorium is beyond reach. Realistically, the ambition should be to make a significant change for the better. Under no circumstances should the best be allowed to stand in the way of the good.

If a moratorium country finds that it has a legitimate need for new weapons in the course of the moratorium period, it would have to give prior notification to the consultative mechanism to be set up by the moratorium countries. The notification should be submitted together with a justification for the planned acquisition. The other participating states may then request further information, or ask for a consultation on the matter. It is better to have a regulated procedure for excemptions, ensuring a degree of transparency, than to have no such regulation and leave it to the state in question to decide what to do in special circumstances.

Participation in the moratorium is voluntary and open to all African states. While it is highly desirable to start with a group of geographically contiguous countries the continuation could, in principle, involve any other African country, bordering on other members or not.

If a state wants to end its participation, it will inform the other participants immediately.

6. Associated Measures

The moratorium is a framework within which a number of measures should be taken to promote the objectives outlined above. The period when the moratorium is in force – the ‘period of grace’ – should be actively exploited, regionally and nationally, to mop up arms and curb illicit transactions.

So far, the application of incentive schemes to collect arms does not show any impressive record. The World Bank study of demobilization and disarmament in Africa noted that ‘weapons buy-back programmes have had limited medium-term impact in reducing the number of weapons circulating in countries which have (1) porous borders with countries with active weapons markets; (2) lack of capacity to enforce regulations on the open carrying and criminal use of weapons; and (3) a political, economic or security climate which enhances the security and economic value of owning and using a weapon’.11 Quite often, this is the predicament.

This is not to say that incentive schemes cannot work. The context can be made more benign by pursuing combinations of approaches as indicated by the above quote from the World Bank report. The programmes themselves can, furthermore, be improved in the light of experiences and lessons that have been gained and drawn since the World Bank report was published. UNIDIR studies suggest that the following requirements are important for such programmes to be effective: (1) creating several well-protected weapons collection points; (2) an impartial ‘no questions asked’ policy; (3) competitive prices, although not too much above market value; and (4) the immediate destruction or secure storage of the weapons handed in.12

Often, compensation in kind should be offered to provide the right incentives and raise the likelihood that the buy-back programmes will work as intended. Money can be too convertible: if this is the only form of compensation, one weapon may simply be replaced by another. If the value of a weapon remains high for lack of an effective police force, lack of economic opportunity other than banditry, or because of dissatisfaction with the government or an opposing armed group, people may use money from a buy-back programme to purchase new weapons. At worst, the programme may then translate into enhanced arms trade.

In some specific contexts, the introduction of economic development projects and activities can encourage grassroots populations to give up their arms in exchange of employment for more sustainable livelihoods. This is the trend in Mali where the UNDP is supporting a series of transborder grassroots dialogues on security through inter-communal encounters.

Regarding the problem of illicit trafficking, the governments may undertake, unilaterally or jointly, a number of supplementary measures. They include, but are not limited, to the following:

v organize, with the assistance of the UN and other interested states, an intensive subregional training programme for police forces and other uniformed services (customs officers, border patrol units, gendarmerie) to enhance their ability and skills to intercept and confiscate illicit transfers of light weapons. Donor agencies should provide the trainers, and the governments of the moratorium countries the trainees. The donors should cover all expenses during the training period.13 

v establish border-crossing ‘hot lines’ for fast and reliable communication with the authorities of all neighbouring states.

v deploy, with the assistance of donor countries, modern technical means of border control. Simple planes and other relatively inexpensive technical means may enhance controls considerably.

v introduce a strict licensing of weapons permits to individual citizens and establish a register of those individuals possessing such weapons.

v develop an appropriate information and education programme for the civilian sectors of society to explain what is being done, what the objectives are, and how civil society may contribute to the endeavour.

As regards future acquisitions of weapons, the governments may wish to establish a regional arms register. The register would contain the relevant information on the procurement of the weapons needed for their uniformed forces, taking into acount the existence of the global arms register of conventional arms maintained at the UN by the Secretary-General.

7. The Role of the UN

In the case of Mali, the UN Resident Coordinator (who is also the UN Resident Representative) was de facto authorized to coordinate what became a comprehensive strategy for peace. The case is unique. Resident Coordinators appointed by the Secretary-General but working within the UNDP structure, formally operate in the context of UNDP’s basic agreement with the host country which, being mostly 25-30 years old, does not envisage any role in security affairs, not to mention in matters of armaments.

The explanation goes back to the UN involvement in Nicaragua, where small arms posed a significant problem. The UN Secretary-General became an advocate of the view that programmes of internal conflict prevention should include measures to control illicit flows of arms, and emphasized that in communications with African leaders. As a result, the President of Mali asked him for advice on how to tackle this problem in Mali and in West Africa more generally, upon which the advisory missions were dispatched. Since the host Government seized the initiative and asked the UN to involve itself in security as well as development issues, it could legitimately develop and coordinate a comprehensive programme that effectively facilitated the peace process in Mali. In order to be operational, this had to be the responsibility of the Resident Coordinator on the ground.

In addition to being a model case of integration of efforts at country level, Mali also became a pioneering example of cooperation between the UNDP and the disarmament branch of the UN. At the high-level consultation in New York in October 1996, which endorsed the principle that development aid might be used in support of the security first approach, Mali was the case in point.14 As described in a recently published book on the peace process in Mali, the UN ‘oiled the machinery’: while only a modest amount of money was used, the effect has been significant.15 

An implementation mechanism has been designed to support the moratorium regime by addressing the related tasks of controlling and collecting, where possible, surplus and illicit arms. It will be the task of this institutional nucleus to facilitate the adoption of the moratorium and help expand its coverage. If this succeeds, another task – requiring more resources – will be needed to mobilize support for border controls and for the associated measures. In the beginning, priority might be given to cooperative measures such as joint training of uniformed services.

Enough money has come forward for the implementation mechanism to start its work at any time. The leadership of the mechanism might be seen in conjunction with the appointment of director of the UN regional disarmament centre in Lomé.16 

By the time Mali and other West African countries declare the moratorium – as they will hopefully do this year – the United Nations should be prepared to call a conference at an appropriately high level to give substance to the dialogue between the moratorium countries and the supplier/donor countries of the Wassenaar Arrangement. This conference could at the same time be a pledging conference in support of associated measures that should be taken while the moratorium is in force.

8. The Role of Donor Countries and NGOs

The implementation of the moratorium and its associated measures are critically dependent on donor support. Spearheaded by Norway, some donor governments are already funding the implementation mechanism. More will be needed for border controls and to finance the associated measures. This is where the dialogue with the Wassenaar countries can help out, especially in getting cooperative measures off the ground.17 National measures to mop up arms and build a secure environment for development may be supported by single donors or donor coalitions on a bilateral basis. Following the case of Mali, the Resident Coordinators should be put in a position to integrate efforts at country level. The implementation mechanism of the moratorium would facilitate coordination at the regional level.

Inspired by the anti-personnel land mines campaign, a great many NGOs are now turning their attention to the problems posed by small arms. Once again, the combination of NGOs and likeminded governments may score some significant successes. Convened by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) and supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this conference is another example of this kind.

When trying to solve a complex, difficult problem, single measures by single agents seldom do. To succeed, different approaches and a variety of measures may have to be combined in a strategy supported by many likeminded actors. The moratorium has been designed with this in mind. Originating in Africa, where the problems are felt, supplier/donor countries are now joining in the effort – and so are the NGOs of NISAT.

As a framework of action, the moratorium is concrete enough to focus work on an unwieldy problem. Hopefully, it is promising enough to inspire regional arrangements also in other parts of the world which are severly affected by the proliferation of light weapons.

 

 

Sverre Lodgaard, born 6 April, 1945, is Director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (1997 - ). He has served as Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (1992–96) and is the author of numerous articles and books on international security and arms control. He is a Council member of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and member of the Norwegian Government’s Advisory Council on Arms Control and Disarmament.

Ivor Fung is the Regional Advisor on Governance and Peace-building at the Regional Bureau for Africa of the United Nations Development Programme. He has been representing the United Nations to Mali and the West African subregion in the context of the Tuareg armed rebellion in Mali and Niger. He also served as Coordinator of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Advisory Mission to the Sahara-Sahel subregion (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Mali Mauritania, Niger).

1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not in any way commit the institutions with which they are affiliated.

2 See Brief 7 from the Bonn International Center for Conversion, and the annual editions of Jane’s Infantry Weapons.

3 Cf. the communiqué from the UNIDIR/UNDP Conference in Bamako, November 1996, at which the Government of Mali first proposed the moratorium.

4 Development Assistance as a Means of Conflict Prevention, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1998.

5 The term ‘integrated’ refers to the need to consider security and development issues in joint fashion. The term ‘proportional’ has no general definition. The meaning of it is that a part of the development aid should be used to create a secure environment for development: usually, it would be a modest part of the total aid flow, but enough to get development projects going.

6 Sverre Lodgaard, ‘Managing Arms in Peace Processes’, Policy Sciences, pp. 143–150, 1997, Kluwer Academic Publishers, the Netherlands.

7 In countries where state authority is beyond question, where law and order systems function very well and violent crime is at a low level – such as in Norway and Switzerland – weapons are widely distributed without creating much of a problem.

8 In a manner analogous to the structure of nuclear weapon-free zone arrangements. The members of a nuclear weapon-free zone undertake not to acquire nuclear arms or host the nuclear weapons of others, while the established nuclear weapon powers commit themselves to respect the status of the zone and not to assist any of the zonal states in acquiring a nuclear weapon capability.

9 In the scholarly litterature on conflict prevention the importance of the security first approach has, in effect, been emphasized, even if it has not been so named. However, it was the advisory missions that brought it across to decision-makers, triggering a chain of steps to turn it into practice. In the course of that process, the approach has been further developed and operationalized.

10 The participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technology are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States.

 

11 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies, The World Bank, October 1993, para. 175.

12 These are mostly lessons drawn from post-conflict situations where arms have been collected in conjunction with demobilization and reintegration of combatants.

13 In Bosnia, there are 1,800 civilian police officers. In West Africa, 180 police trainers could do much to enhance the quality of local police units.

14 The Nordic UN Study stressed the need for integration of efforts at the country level. See The Nordic UN Reform Project 1996, Oslo: UD, 1997. Development Assistance as a Means of Conflict Prevention, op. cit., stresses the need for integration at Headquarters as well.

Sometimes, international politics make it easier for single donors and coalitions of donors to seize the initiative than for the United Nations to do so. Then, integration and flexibility of efforts may be in high demand also at the donor end.

15 Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace of Timbuctu. Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva, 1998.

16 The 1997 UN General Assembly decided to revitalize the regional centre and appoint a director. It would be natural to ask the new director to head the implementation mechanism as well, since implementation of the moratorium might be the most important disarmament task in this part of Africa anyhow.

17 This presupposes proper coordination at national level between the Wassenaar/donor country bureaucracies. Among the two contributions that are asked of these governments – to respect the provisions of the moratorium and to assist in its implementation – the first one is a bona fide matter for the export control agencies represented in the Wassenaar Arrangement while the second calls on support from the donor agencies.

 

 

 

Appendix

Some Common Names and Models of Small Arms

Technical Specifications

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