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Chapter 5 Flying the Company ‘Flags of Convenience’ Beneath a cargo plane’s external paintwork and its simple registration number lie the intricacies of the international aviation business. Especially in poorer countries, the limited capacity of national aviation authorities to monitor and regulate the increasingly complex business makes it easy for weapons trafficking networks to operate. According to the US International Air Cargo Association, the international rules governing cargo planes are archaic and inconsistent.1 Airfreight businesses want faster procedures and simpler regulations, but many countries lack the resources for stringent airport monitoring of dangerous cargoes. Electronic tagging systems akin to those for international passenger baggage would be fast – but costly. Currently, airfreight documents such as air waybills and cargo manifests do not require detailed descriptions or cross-referencing of the goods described in arms export and import licences. The routes, names of sub-contractors, the ultimate supplier and customer do not need to be specified. Arms have been found described as ‘agricultural equipment’, ‘mining equipment’, ‘spare parts’, ‘fish’, ‘tents’, and ‘second-hand clothing’, so it is easy to see how the absence of comprehensive records makes it exceedingly difficult for law enforcers to quickly identify all those who may be involved. It is not only cargo that needs international monitoring. An aircraft registration number and the name of the airline leasing or operating the plane can be switched so as to conceal an operation. A cargo aircraft might typically be registered in one country, then leased and chartered by companies registered in another, while their crews can be hired in yet other countries. In addition, the plane might be serviced and based for practical purposes somewhere else, with the main operating offices of the airline or the handling agency based in yet another country or countries. The sub-leasing of international overflight permissions means that one air carrier can use another carrier’s call sign, and this has been used to obfuscate arms deliveries. The more complex the arrangements, and the less capacity there is to monitor them, the simpler it is for operators, agents and sub-contractors to find ways of denying their involvement in illicit trafficking. A national authority that registers an aircraft to fly under its flag may fail to ensure the airworthiness and safety of that plane. Airlines, planes and aircrew may not all be required to register, and foreign operator permits may carry minimal responsibilities. Even where several aviation authorities try to carry out routine checks on an aircraft’s filed flight plan, they will usually not have Conversations with pilots, loadmasters and aviation inspectors show how easy it is to evade existing controls in countries that lack regulatory resources. A cargo plane was named as flying in at an airport with one registration number and then flying out with a different one. Another airline was said to have changed its corporate structure and name overnight when its name became linked to illicit activities. One operator used an old licence that had been cancelled by aviation authorities to fly several ‘ghost planes’ to hot spots in Africa. Another corporate owner used the logo and colours of a licensed company to fly non-licensed planes. Yet another abusive practice reported was when a cargo plane using a certain flight schedule arrived very late at its stated destination: the plane had in fact made an illegal landing on the way to its destination, unloading illicit cargo without reporting it. More often, non-scheduled landings are used to load illicit cargo en route, and then ship the additional load under cover of the legal cargo.
Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, lacks sufficient skilled air traffic controllers, radar equipment and trained personnel to monitor the vast air space between the southern border of Egypt and the northern borders of South Africa.2 Smaller freight operators often use older aircraft that can evade long-range radar. Moreover, the communications systems of ex-Soviet aircraft are not always compatible with those of other aircraft, making it necessary for pilots to be able to guide themselves. 3 Thus, pilots with military training are in demand. Sub-Saharan air traffic control has been highly Air Trafficking to UNITAThe experience of Angola illustrates many of these problems. A UN arms and fuel embargo against the UNITA rebel movement was agreed in 1993, but air cargo companies have been easily able to punch holes in it.5 Initially, few attempts were made to enforce the embargo. The rebels rejected the 1992 UN-brokered election results and, after escalating civilian atrocities, a peace agreement was finally signed in Lusaka in November 1994. Despite UNITA’s pledge to disarm and demobilize its troops, as foreseen under the agreement, the movement was rearming from 1996 onwards at an alarming pace. This led to the widening of the UN mandatory embargo in October 1997 and again in June 1998, and belated attempts to enforce it. 6 UNITA is a magnet for international traffickers because it can generate several hundred million dollars every year. The rebel movement’s ability to acquire arms, fuel and other goods has been based upon its control of a considerable diamond trade and a sophisticated logistical presence, including several large airstrips, in eastern and central Angola.7 Arms brokers and suppliers based mainly in Africa and Europe have used these resources to provide the rebel movement with tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, missiles, infantry weapons, small arms, ammunition and anti-personnel landmines, primarily of Eastern European origin. 8 The constant logistical challenge for these arms fixers is how to transport arms into UNITA-held territory without being seen or caught, and how to switch regional access routes to avoid detection. In March 1997, it was reported in Kinshasa that ‘Mobutu’s top aides provided protection to a dozen arms traders, including Zairians, Lebanese and at least one Portuguese, according to Zairian journalists and Western sources. The traders run a clutch of airlines from Kinshasa’s N'Djili International Airport, using about 15 planes and crews hired from Russia.’9 A major source of this weaponry was Bulgaria. In May 1997, this Kinshasa pipeline was rapidly shifted to Pointe Noire in the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) because of the downfall of Mobutu’s regime. It was business as usual – during July 1997, the scaled-down UN observer mission in Angola reported 120 flights landing at UNITA-controlled airstrips. 10 But, with the fall of Lissouba in October that year, UNITA’s procurement chiefs and their middlemen had to find or reactivate other arms routes. 11
From late 1997, UNITA developed at least two major arms-supply strategies. Each could reinforce the other. First, there were new routes and deals within the surrounding sub-region. In particular, UNITA’s traditional brokers and carriers based in South Africa – some with US, West or East European nationality – shifted their operations to enable land, sea and air routes via Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania and neighbouring territories. The Luanda and Pretoria governments had some success in countering this, but not enough. In December 1997, there had been 186 illegal flights into Angola, mostly out of South Africa, but this number had fallen to about 40 flights during
The second strategy was to encourage long-distance flights to UNITA airfields from Eastern Europe using larger freighters. An example given by a captured UNITA
Ex-Soviet Business Steps In
In May 1998, the South African authorities announced the expulsion of over 20 pilots and few private air cargo companies operating from a large northern airport near Pietersburg. They were charged with over 100 breaches of civil aviation regulations and accused of transporting fuel tanks, food, clothing and mining equipment to UNITA.16 Most of those involved were from the former Soviet Union. During the 1990s, such air cargo operators had established themselves in easy-to-register aviation authorities in Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland. 17 Some seemed to have their eyes on rewards of future mineral concessions if they won the war. 18 As the South
The case of one Russian operator, Viktor B.,20 and his partners serves to illustrate the trend. Viktor B., according to a police officer in South Africa, is thought to be a Viktor B.’s operating office was based in Belgium between 1995 and 1997, where he, together with a Belgian pilot and a French partner, ran two companies – a handling agency called the Trans Aviation Network Group (or TAN Group), and an office for an air-cargo company, Air Cess, the planes of which were registered in Liberia. An operating address also existed in Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates and in Geneva, Switzerland.22 Viktor B. lived near the airport of Oostend, where the planes were maintained. 23 In late 1996 the rent for the offices of the TAN Group at the airport was cancelled and Air Cess took them over. A few months later, the latter company also left Oostend. 24 The sudden departure coincided with the publication of an international report 25 and articles in the Belgian press, 26 focusing on the role of the cargo airport of Oostend in sanctions-busting activities to Central Africa, and the arming of the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide.
In 1997, the Liberian Minister of Transport appointed the Belgian pilot, who had flown for the Saudi royal family, as Chairman of the Liberian Aviation Authority’s agency in the United Kingdom.27 Liberia has been a flag of convenience for the fringe air-cargo industry because of its lax licence and tax laws. A company incorporated there can locate its executive offices in another country, conducting business activities at any location. Names of corporate officers or shareholders need not be filed or listed, and there is no minimum capital requirement. A legal existence can be obtained in one day. The country also has lax maritime and aviation laws and regulations that provide owners of ship and aircraft maximum discretion and cover, with minimal regulatory interference. Aviation officers and pilots have suggested that aircraft registered in
In August 1997, Air Cess Swaziland (Ply) Ltd., directed by Viktor B., was granted a two-year licence by the Swaziland Civil Aviation Authorities.29 But in 1998 the
Air Cess was one of these de-registered companies. It was accused in Swaziland of being involved in gunrunning between Mozambique and Angola using the revoked
Some of the other UN-inspected Russian- or Ukrainian-built aircraft using the Swazi register as a flag of convenience were reportedly operating from airports in South In 1999, the main operating office of Air Cess and the TAN Group continued to be Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates, even though the aircraft were based in several other African countries.39 The Belgian pilot, who was co-owner of the two Belgian registered companies and the chief executive of one, was also reported to have another address in Sharjah. Viktor, who also lived in Europe, appeared to be using a last name in Sharjah that differed slightly from the one he used for his registration in Belgium. 40 According to officials in southern Africa, Viktor B. uses five different passports, two of which are Russian. 41 In late 1998, the aircraft operated by his trading and handling agency in Sharjah were reportedly using Russian or Ukrainian crews based at Kigali airport, in Rwanda, and were accused of loading supplies for the armed opposition groups in war-torn eastern Congo and Angola. 42 An Angolan news source also refers to Viktor B. as ‘the current spearhead’ in the sale of weapons for Jonas Savimbi, UNITA’s leader. 43 In 1999, ‘a man whose name resembles one of Viktor B.’s many aliases’ was also reported to be involved with an Ugandan airforce training operation. 44 A human rights researcher also reported on Viktor B.’s sanctions-busting activities from South Africa to UNITA.45 According to his report, aviation authorities at South Africa’s Pieterburg Airport visited AirPass in April 1998 and, after assessing its documentation, issued ‘200 charges for violations of the Civil Aviation Act’, including transporting ‘fuel tanks, tow trucks, boots, ponchos, food and mining equipment’ to UNITA-held areas. 46 AirPass is a subsidiary of Air Cess and is run by Viktor B. and a Russian business partner. 47 No arrests or confiscations in the case were made, this report goes on, because ‘individuals involved in sanctions-busting operations via South-Africa use foreign-registered companies’ and ‘they can not easily be touched as these fall outside South Africa’s legal jurisdiction.’ 48 AirPass has since moved some of its planes to other national registers.
Belgian aviation and political authorities have made similar remarks when questioned over the use of Belgian airports by companies such as Air Cess.49 Viktor B.’s company left Belgium in 1997 with a number of other companies, all using old aircraft,
In January 1999, a plane belonging to Viktor B. was also allegedly used in conjunction with planes from Skyair and Occidental Airlines – a partly Belgian-owned but UK-run charter company – to ferry arms from Bratislava via Liberia and the Gambia to a bush airstrip for the Revolutionary United Front [RUF], the Sierra Leone armed opposition that was committing horrific atrocities against civilians.53 Viktor B. has usually leased his freighter aircraft to other operators, so would claim ignorance of any such dealings. And the reluctance of the UK authorities to prosecute Sky Air and Sandline 54 for helping arm the Sierra Leone government forces meant that there would probably not be legal action to enforce the arms embargo against the RUF rebels either. When the British Prime Minister was challenged in February 1999 to close the loopholes on UK arms flights, he replied, ‘We have been leading the way on arms control in the European Union. It is true that the rebels have been rearmed, but they have not been Flying the Red Sea RoutesInside the cargo plane, along with the cargo itself, sit the aircrew. They work in secrecy and often in danger. Their stories of moving the arms cargoes can reveal more than the false paper trails of the arms brokers themselves.
In late 1998 a largely British crew flew an old Boeing 707 freighter with 42 tonnes of arms and ammunition from Bratislava in the Slovak Republic to Khartoum.56 The arms were for the Sudanese army, which was perpetrating systematic abuses against civilians as part of its campaign against Southern insurgents. If the British and Slovak government authorities inquired, the crew would say they were delivering the arms – 100 mm explosive shells – not to a country embargoed by the European Union, but to the government of Chad. 57 In reality, documents and interviews with former crew Between December 1998 and February 1999, members of the crew said that there had been several arm flights to Sudan; each delivery was said to be worth approximately $55,000, to be split between the crew and the Belgian charterer of the old Boeing. However, on 7 February 1999, the old Boeing ploughed into the mud at the end of the runway at Bratislava airport. The Swiss owner of the Boeing, who had registered the plane in Cyprus, said he did not know anything about illicit arms flights. He said that the Belgian had chartered the plane to ship frozen fish from Tanzania to Austria.60 This was not the first time that a largely British crew had flown arms towards the Red Sea using a cover story. In 1994, another British pilot told a UK television company that he unwittingly flew arms to the Yemen and Angola. Both countries were at the time subject to international arms embargoes and devastated by wars in which large numbers of civilians were being deliberately targeted. As with the most recent deliveries, the flight documents were dodgy and the routes were deliberately devious, to get around any suspecting authorities.61 Describing one episode in 1994, the British pilot said: We actually left the United Kingdom flying a charter flight carrying relief goods down to Kilimanjaro in East Africa…for the Rwandan crisis. …While we were in Kilimanjaro we were given instructions to proceed to a place I’d never heard of before, Plovdiv in Bulgaria. We weren’t told what the nature of the operation was. It was just another charter. We flew from Kilimanjaro to Plovdiv where we embarked on a series of arms flights…I do not know on what point we became aware…I guess we knew they were arms flights when we actually saw the aircraft being loaded…with what we were told was government-to-government cargo. … Although there was no paperwork accompanying the boxes, it was quite clear that’s what’s in them.’62 The instructions to the pilot and his crew to go to Plovdiv in Bulgaria came from the offices of a UK company, Peak Aviation, which was at the time also involved in arms flights to the armed Hutu extremists in eastern Zaire (see Chapter 3) .The refuelling of the Peak Aviation aircraft en route from Bulgaria took place in Cairo. On arrival in Plovdiv, the pilot says he was told to give the destination of the aircraft as N'Djamena in Chad, but when arriving in Cairo he was told to file a new flight plan giving the destination as Muscat, Oman. Once the plane was on its way to Oman, the crew were told to divert to Mukalla airport near Riyan in South Yemen, and then to fly a specific circuitous route over Saudi Arabian airspace: We flew out to sea and we descended over the sea when we could, and did a very steep approach with no power on, so that if they were firing heat seeking missiles, there’s a bigger chance they wouldn’t actually connect with the engines. We maintained radio silence, all the lights switched off. …I lost one and a half stone in the ten flights, which is probably an indication of how nervous it made me. A company called Phoenix Bulgaria chartered all of the flights that the British pilot flew to Yemen. He said that Phoenix paid Peak Aviation of the UK approximately $386,000 for the flights; the bonus for each flight was $7,000, which was split The big bucks in the rather sort of darker world of this arms dealing seems to be around civil wars... because landing in the wrong country or for the wrong side you could end up you know losing your life ... there’s a very limited number of companies that would actually touch any kinds of arms flying at all, even government-to-government arms flying…and there’s an even smaller number of firms that would get involved in a civil war type operation ... it is just so dangerous. Peak Aviation seem to have specialised in this The aircraft used by Peak Aviation was not registered in the UK but used ‘an African flag of convenience’.63 The crews were British and the airline was controlled from Burgess Hill in the UK. The aircraft technical log-book (‘captain’s voyage report’) was used by the British pilot to record all his flights for Peak Aviation. All the manifests for the cargo on these particular flights were in sealed envelopes carried by a Bulgarian who would not let the crew look at them. Several different Bulgarians flew on the arms flights to South Yemen. They would pay only for the flying that was done against the captain’s voyage report, which the pilot says he submitted to Peak Aviation. He assumed that Peak got paid by submitting those voyage reports to back up their invoices. According to the pilot, there were several Saudi Arabians at the South Yemen airport during the time the Peak Aviation aircraft was being off-loaded. On one occasion there was a VIP Boeing 727 parked alongside, with a delegation of what appeared to be very high-ranking diplomatic and military people on board. He said that this helped explain another peculiar feature of the arms flights he carried out involving the USA:
Following the Gulf War, the United States government stationed a number of AWAC aircraft – the Boeing 707s with the big ray guns on top – in the Gulf area. And on two of the flights we did across Saudi we actually saw two of them flying along with us. So we must have been observed, and I'm sure the United States government must have known exactly where we took off and where we were going. Asked if he would do this again, the pilot replied: I mean government-to-government flying, no problem at all, but I would not wish to be involved in anything to do with civil war ever again. … One of the things that really shocked me about this flying was that, after the second flight, they turned the airport terminal in Mukalla near Riyan in the Yemen into like a MASH field hospital ... I've never actually fought in a war and I found it particularly upsetting to see rows of very badly injured troops and civilians and children, lying there being fed by saline drips [in a] very, very poor state of medical care. By our tenth flight the numbers were really quite phenomenal ...they were the people that were injured on our side ... there was no feedback at all about what happened in North Yemen...
By November 1994, the British pilot had set up his own UK company, Phoenix Aviation, to fly live cattle to France and the Netherlands from Coventry airport in the UK. However, the following month his leased Boeing 737 crashed near Baginton airport, narrowly missing a housing estate and killing all five crew.64 He continued his air cargo business by leasing two Russian ex-Aeroflot planes, but by May 1995 Phoenix Aviation was apparently in financial trouble and he had to suspend the flights. In April 1996, he bought a small BAC 1-11 freighter that was due to be scrapped, and
Meanwhile, the flooding of Yemen with arms has continued, reflecting the growth of Eastern European companies involved in the private markets. On 9 April 1999, the Moldavian authorities detained a Ukrainian cargo plane in Kishinev which was __________________ 1 TIACA Times, Fall 1998. The President claimed that ‘Practices, policies and nomenclature keyed to the sailing ship still dominate’ the air freight industry. The International Air Transport Association agreements, and hence the documentation, for cargo are viewed as being out of date because they assume that freight forwarders are simply the appointed agents of air cargo carriers, rather than independent brokers, charterers and sales agents. 2 Even South Africa in 1997 had far too few resources to monitor the 36 airports used for international traffic. After much international criticism, the government reduced the number of such airports to eight and promised to increase customs, immigration, police and air traffic control. See Alex Vines, Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 1999), pp.116–117. 3 Christopher Bellamy & Elizabeth Wine, ‘Fears Grow in a Bad Year for Aviation Safety’, The Independent, 14 November 1996. 4 Vines, Angola Unravels, Ch. 9; also authors’ interviews with customs agents, police, aviation inspectors, pilots, airline owners and officials in Belgium, the UK, South Africa, and Zambia. 5 John Grobbler, ‘UNITA’s SA supply routes blocked’, Weekly Mail & Guardian, 6 February 1996. 6 UN Security Council Resolution 864 of 15 September 1993 imposed an oil and arms embargo on UNITA and set up a Sanctions Committee to oversee the implementation of these sanctions. After numerous postponements and warnings over UNITA’s persistent failure to substantially disarm and demobilize the troops under its control, in August 1997 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1127. This imposed additional measures restricting the travel of UNITA’s officials and their relatives, as well as stipulating the closure of all UNITA’s offices abroad, the prohibition of flights of aircraft by or for UNITA, and a ban on the supply of any aircraft or spare parts to UNITA.These measures supposedly came into force on 30 October 1997, but their violation led the Security Council to adopt additional measures that came into force on 1 July 1998. Resolution 1173 requires all states to freeze the financial resources, funds and assets of UNITA and prohibits all official contacts with UNITA’s leadership in areas of Angola not under the control of the central government. Resolution 1173 bans the importation and trade of diamonds from Angola where such diamonds are not accompanied by a government certificate of origin. The Resolution also outlaws any other form of supply or trade relations with UNITA, except for humanitarian or medical purposes, and with the authorization of the Sanctions Committee established by the Security Council. All states are required under these Resolutions to adopt measures to ensure the implementation of the embargo and to report any violations of the embargo known to them to the Sanctions Committee. 7 Most rough diamonds from UNITA sales end up in Antwerp. Several NGOs, research groups and investigative journalists have in recent years documented the rearmament and sanctions-busting process. See for instance: Vines, Angola Unravels; and A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict, Global Witness, London, 1999; ‘Angola: Between War and Peace. Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses Since the Lusaka Protocol’, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch Arms Project, vol. 8, no 1, February 1996; Angola: Endgame or Stalemate? Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, South Africa, 1998. 8 The Angolan government also bought weaponry from Eastern Europe, especially Russia, Ukraine and Bulgaria, as well as from China, Portugal, Brazil and South Africa. In 1996, the government attempted to persuade the Bulgarian authorities to prevent arms reaching UNITA. The government markets less diamonds than UNITA, but collects revenue from current and future oil production. Paul Beaver of Jane’s Information Service describes UNITA’s new re-armament programme in Chris Gordon, Mail and Guardian, 15 January 1999. 9 James Rupert, ‘Zaire Reportedly Selling Arms to Angolan Rebels’, Washington Post, 21 March 1997. 10 Http://www.un.org/docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997640.htm 11 Morocco remained an important traditional source of military support for UNITA. 12 Statement by the Chair of the UN Sanctions Committee on Angola, 22 April 1998, quoted in Vines, Angola Unravels. 13 John Grobbler, Tangeni Amupadhi & Chris Gordon, ‘Jailed South Africans Flew Army Trucks to UNITA’, Mail and Guardian, 1 May 1998. 14 Journal de Angola, 1 February 1999. Vines, Angola Unravels, mentions another deal to supply surface-to-air-missiles from Bulgaria, supposedly to Zambia, which was stopped in October 1998 after an official exposed it. The Zambian government denied any knowledge of it. A US-Ukrainian company, Miltex, reportedly presented the ‘Zambian’ end-user certificate, but the company denies any involvement. 15 Unpublished information from the UN. 16 Interviews with an aviation expert, South Africa, May 1999; ‘South Africa Expels Pilots’, Angola News Roundup, 9 April 1999. 17 Interviews with aviation expert and police personnel, South Africa, May 1999. 18 Moscow NTV, 9 August 1998, describes Russian military involvement and diamond interest in Angola. 19 See Khareen Pech, in J. Cilliers & P. Mason, eds, Peace Profit or Plunder?, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, and Canadian Council for International Peace Research, Ottawa, 1999. 20 We will call this man Viktor B, since his last name repeatedly changes in reports. The authors found: Victor Bout, Victor Butt, Victor S. Butt, Victor S. Budd, Victor Bont and Victor Bouta. 21 Interviews in South Africa, May 1999. Also: Mark Honigsbaum, Anthony Barnett & Brian Johnson, ‘British Pilot Flies Arms to Sudan’, The Observer, 14 March 1999. 22 Information from the Oostend trade register, copies of documents with the letterheads of these companies, used to rent the offices. 23 Information obtained through interviews at Oostend airport and the Jet Center (business centre near the airport where Viktor B. also kept an office), confirmed by an official from the Ministry of Justice. 24 Letters from the law firm that took care of the renting of the offices for both the TAN Group and Air Cess in Oostend. 25 UNICOI, Third Report (1 November 1996), UN Doc.S/1997/1010, released 24 December 1997. (Although the UNICOI Report was not officially released until December 1997, copies of it were circulating among the press in late 1996.) 26 Roger Huisman, ‘Sleutelrol voor Oostende in wapenhandel Grote Meren’, Het Belang van Limburg, 20 November–1 December 1996; Roger Huisman, ‘Gerechtelijk onderzoek: wapenhandel Oostende’, Het Beland van Limburg, 16 August 1999. The latter article refers to a judicial inquiry from the prosecutor of Bruges, into arms trafficking from Oostend. 27 A letter to this effect was sent to other aviation authorities. The pilot’s background was described in La Lettre du Continent, no. 334, 29 July 1999. 28 One aviation officer in South Africa referred to ‘highly irregular and illegal’ practices. A spokesman of a Belgian pilots’ association suggested that Liberian planes should not be allowed to land in Belgium or elsewhere. 29 Licence Number obtained: ASL/97009/37/02. The licence was valid until 19 August 1999. (Swaziland Licence Applications and Licences Granted, published 10 March 1998.) 30 Interviews with the Swazi embassy in Brussels; interview with Mr P. Lott, a South African aviation expert who chaired the commission of enquiry probing the fraudulent registration of the aircraft, April and May 1999. 31 ‘Ex-minister Admits Registering "War" Planes’, The Swazi Observer, 11 January 1999. 32 ‘Swaziland Seizes Helicopter Gunships’, Mail & Guardian, 10 July 1998; also The Times of Swaziland, 10 July 1998; and ‘Rwanda Wants Govt to Release Military Planes’, Swazi Observer, 12 January 1999. 33 ‘SD Being Used for Arms Smuggling to Angola ?, The Swazi Observer, 21 May 1999. 34 Fax from the UN, September 1997. 35 Interviews with aviation official in South Africa. Also: World Airline Directory 1995-1998, Flight International 24, 30 March 1999; Ulrich Klee, JP Airline Fleets International, 1999–2000 (33rd edn), Glattburg, Switzerland: Bucher & Co, March 1999. 36 Interviews with aviation official in South Africa. Also: World Airline Directory 1995–1998; JP Airline-Fleets International, 1999–2000. 37 ‘SD Being Used for Arms Smuggling to Angola?’, The Swazi Observer, 21 May 1999. 38 Interview with aviation official, May 1999. 39 Reflected on his business card and aviation registers, Klee, JP Airline Fleets International. 40 Comparison of documents from the Belgian trade registrar 1995–96, a business card from Viktor B. in Shardjah and his name mentioned in Klee, JP Airline Fleets International. 41 Interviews with officials, May 1999, copies of passport numbers disclosed. 42 New Briefs, NCN (New Congo Net) News, 29 December 1998. Available on the internet at: http://www.marekinc.com/NCN/News12291.html 43 ‘Ukraine Citizen Supplying Arms to UNITA’, FBIS translation from Noticias de Angola, 7 June 1999. Vines, Angola Unravels, refers to a US intelligence assessment that mentions Viktor B. and Air Cess as being known to supply services to UNITA in exchange for diamonds. An Interpol report disclosed to the authors in 1999 concurs with this. 44 ‘Air Force In Formation’, The Indian Ocean Newsletter, no. 853, 10 April 1999. 45 Vines, Angola Unravels. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Interviews in Belgium by the authors. The Belgian Foreign Ministry ordered an investigation into the role of these companies in 1997. The results of the investigation were never published (interview with Ministry of Justice official, May 1999). 50 M. Gillard, P. Wintour & D. Connell, ‘Second British Firm Caught in Foreign Office Arms Web’, The Observer (London), 10 May 1998 (on Sky Air). 51 This is the name that Viktor B. used when operating from Belgium. 52 Honigsbaum et al., ‘British Pilot Flies Arms to Sudan’. 53 Leppard et al., ‘British Firms Arming Sierra Leone Rebels’. 54 Report of the Sierra Leone Arms Investigation (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 27 July 1998). 55 House of Commons Hansard Debates, 10 February 1999, (pt 21) Column 314–315. 56 Information provided by Honigsbaum et al.., ‘British Pilot Flies Arms to Sudan’. 57 A ‘full scope’ arms embargo was imposed on Sudan by the European Union in March 1994. The Chad end-user certificate is dated 8 August 1998. 58 Ibid. 59 Information provided by Brian Johnson-Thomas, ibid. The invoices were made out to the Damascus firm by the Slovak arms manufacturer. The owner of the Damascus firm also ran a company in Bratislava. 60 Ibid. 61 20-20 Television, ‘The Big Story’, 17 November 1994. We are grateful to Brian Johnson-Thomas and 20-20 Television for permission to cite this interview material. 62 Ibid. 63 According to the ‘captain’s voyage reports’, the Boeing 707 was registered in Ghana as 9GEBK. 64 ‘Veal Export Firm "Phoenix Aviation" Goes Into Liquidation’, Daily Mirror, 17 July 1995. 65 Sarah Horner & Brian Johnson-Thomas, ‘Veal Row Boss in Airline Deal with Afghan Rebels’, Daily Express, 9 June 1996. 66 Itar-Tass, ‘Moldavia Detains Ukrainian Plane Loaded with Hidden Arms’, 9 April 1999. __________________ |
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Preface /
Acknowledgments /
Introduction /
Chapter 1 /
Chapter 2 /
Chapter 3 /
Chapter 4 /
Chapter 5 /
Chapter 6 /
Chapter 7 /
Chapter 8 /
Chapter 9 /
Chapter 10 /
Chapter 11 |